



THE IMPERIAL TREATY POWER 
BRIAN RICHARDSON† 
The modern debate over the scope of the federal government’s treaty-making power 
is largely framed by motivated histories written at the turn of the last century. These 
histories, by and large, gave a legal imprimatur to the acquisition of the insular 
possessions and the exercise of colonial government over them. A principal contribution 
of these constitutional histories was to make it an obvious proposition that the American 
treaty-making power contained the law-of-nations power to acquire territory and to 
take an imperial sovereign’s original title to it: “What Spain could do we can do.” 
This Article contends that these imperial and canonical histories of the treaty-
making power erased a vibrant and contrary view of American foreign-affairs 
federalism. This now-interred theory of American foreign-affairs federalism, which 
produced victories in several important public law disputes in prior eras, argued that 
the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of sovereign power to the popular sovereign 
proscribed both the state and federal governments from exercising an “eminent 
dominion” over territory. That is to say, this rival view forbade both the state and 
federal governments from acquiring territory, ceding territory, and holding original 
title to territory so acquired. Crucially, this idea rejected altogether the familiar lens 
of “dual-sovereignty” in limiting the foreign-affairs powers of American governments. 
This Article traces the arc of the erased idea about the American governments’ 
foreign-affairs powers through bureaucratic archives, state and federal court decisions, 
and various sources of elite legal opinion. In accounting for the bygone victories of the 
now-dormant idea, as well as the ultimate defeat of that idea at the hands of imperial 
bureaucrats, the Article sheds new light on one of the central preoccupations of the 
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modern public law governing America’s foreign relations. I contend that the imperial 
history continues to cast a dubious shadow over our current debates about the treaty-
making power and the status of American territory that is not yet a state. And I argue 
that modern federal courts’ reliance on historically inflected arguments about our 
foreign-affairs powers is often fundamentally misguided. Our received constitutional 
histories from the early-twentieth century are often motivated glosses—sometimes 
committed to shoring up an imperial enterprise—that do not offer neutral principles 
to settle our hard cases. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In April of 1911, John Bassett Moore, a law professor, statesman, and 
sometime-judge on the Permanent Court of International Justice, delivered a 
series of lectures at Johns Hopkins University on the history of American 
government. Moore explained that in undertaking these lectures, his first 
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duty as a historian was to “deal[] in realities.”1 Surveying the prior century, 
Moore explained that there had been, in reality, several “phases” in the 
political development of American public law: the first was “federalism,” and 
the two most recent were “imperialism” and “expansion.”2 In Moore’s view, 
the latter phases involved frequent acquisitions of new territories and peoples, 
despite the clamor of those who argued that “[w]e do not want more territory 
any more than we want fish bones in our coffee.”3 Indeed, he noted, “the fish 
bones have continued to appear in our cups and we have continued to gulp 
them down without any specially unseemly grimaces.”4 
Moore’s theory of the development of American public law, and his effort 
to discern a long arc of history culminating in the recent imperial acquisitions, 
mirrored views held by many other prominent professors, bureaucrats, and 
courts of his time. These curators of constitutional culture left behind a now-
canonical history of American foreign-affairs federalism that pervades 
modern debates concerning the power to acquire territory by treaty and to 
subject it to the sovereignty of Congress. 
In a debate now lost to modern legal argument, this imperial history of 
our governments’ foreign-affairs powers reduced a diverse and rivalrous 
debate about American federalism to something far simpler. Namely, Moore 
and many others jettisoned the longstanding argument that the Tenth 
Amendment limits federal treaty-making power not by reserving a plenary 
police power over “domestic” concerns to the states (a familiar claim of 
modern dual-sovereign federalism), but rather by “reserving” to the people 
themselves any use of the treaty-making power that affects the constitutive 
relationship between the state and federal governments and the people (call 
it popular-sovereign federalism, which sees in our federalism the allocation of 
power between state and federal “dual governments”). The popular-sovereign 
theory of foreign-affairs power viewed the relevant “sovereign” whose 
interests might be infringed by the treaty-making power as the popular 
sovereign, and it dismissed appeals to state and federal sovereignty in 
understanding the treaty power’s limits. Because neither the state nor the 
federal government could engage in this sort of treaty-making, the popular-
sovereign theory could therefore define a small but defensible set of subject-
matter limitations on the treaty-making power. 
To parse this more carefully: chief among the limitations imposed by 
the popular-sovereign view of the treaty-making power is that no 
 
1 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, FOUR PHASES OF AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT: FEDERALISM-
DEMOCRACY-IMPERIALISM-EXPANSION 6 (1912). 
2 Id. at 7. 
3 Id. at 149 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
4 Id. 
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government—neither state nor federal—can claim the sovereign “eminent 
dominion” necessary to exercise imperial government over territory outside 
of the union. Although, in the American republic, the popular sovereign is 
ordinarily dormant,5 its agents cannot act to change its composition by 
treaty while it sleeps. Yet that is the subject-matter limitation on the treaty-
making power most frequently breached in our constitutional history—
breaches, as I shall argue, that were omitted from canonical histories of the 
treaty power to serve imperial ends. 
Today, in the wake of the seminal decision of Missouri v. Holland and more 
recently in Bond v. United States, we are accustomed to thinking that if the 
exercise of the treaty-making power has any limit at all, it must be found in 
the balance that “our federalism”6 strikes between the federal and state “dual 
sovereigns.” In Holland, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes denied that the 
Constitution imposed a subject-matter limitation on the federal treaty-
making power within the states; Holmes framed the relevant question as 
“whether [a treaty] is forbidden by some invisible radiation from the general 
terms of the Tenth Amendment.”7 And in Bond, six Justices avoided revisiting 
Holland by creating a federalism-inspired clear-statement rule to narrow a 
 
5 See infra text accompanying note 27 (describing Richard Tuck’s Seeley Lectures on the 
“sleeping sovereign”). 
6 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 855 (2014) (summarizing Bond’s views 
concerning the treaty power’s capacity to “afford the [federal] Government a police power” and 
“usurp[] . . . traditional state authority”); id. at 879 (Scalia, J., concurring) (concluding that a case 
affording the federal government a broad treaty-making power “places Congress only one treaty 
away from acquiring a general police power”); id. at 882 (Thomas, J., concurring) (concluding that 
“the Treaty Power . . . is itself a limited power,” as otherwise the Treaty Power “would . . . lodge in 
the Federal Government a potential for a ‘police power’ . . . [that] would threaten the ‘liberties that 
derive from the diffusion of sovereign power’” (citations omitted)); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 
416, 432-433 (1920) (analyzing whether a statute implementing a migratory bird treaty was 
unconstitutional because it interfered with rights reserved to the states); Curtis A. Bradley, The 
Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 450-461 (1998) (surveying options for 
“protecting federalism” from a broad treaty-making power and proposing “equal treatment” of 
federal statutes and treaties that attends to the “states’ rights”); David M. Golove, Treaty-Making 
and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. 
L. REV. 1075, 1279-86, 1310-14 (2000) (rejecting Professor Bradley’s proposed limitations on the 
treaty-making power in light of the “nationalist” decision by the founders to “lodge the whole of the 
foreign-affairs powers exclusively in the national government”); see also Oona Hathaway et al., The 
Treaty Power: Its History, Scope, and Limits, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 239, 249 (2013) (canvassing 
founding-era history and concluding that the states “g[ave] up all power over foreign relations to 
the central government” but retained “structural and procedural checks to protect states’ interests”); 
Duncan B. Hollis, Executive Federalism: Forging New Federalist Constraints on the Treaty Power, 79 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1327, 1329-31 (2006) (describing two “camps” that have emerged on the question 
whether “federalism constrain[s] the Article II treaty power”: the “nationalists” and the “new 
federalists”); Michael D. Ramsey, Missouri v. Holland and Historical Textualism, 73 MO. L. REV. 
969, 980 (2008) (offering a “historical textualist” account defending the proposition that “treaties 
cannot overturn protections of state sovereignty expressed elsewhere in the Constitution’s text”). 
7 252 U.S. at 433-34. 
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statute implementing a treaty.8 Three Justices in Bond, however, would have 
held that American federalism does not tolerate a “conceal[ed] . . . police 
power over domestic affairs” and thus must proscribe the federal treaty-
making power to make agreements concerning “wholly domestic[]” matters 
or agreements that might “regulate the relationship between nations and their 
own citizens.”9 Justice Thomas predicted that “the increasing frequency with 
which treaties have begun to test the limits of the Treaty Power” would offer 
the Court the opportunity to limit the power “soon enough.”10 
As I shall argue, however, the more important and now-forgotten limit on 
the treaty-making power, which was frequently consequential in our 
constitutional history, followed from an altogether different view of the 
nature of sovereignty in a constitutional republic. Recovering this purged 
constitutional history counsels caution about the broad reception of the 
history written by law professors, bureaucrats, and courts about the treaty-
making power at the turn of the twentieth century. That history still 
dominates our modern public law concerning the treaty-making power and 
the status of the insular possessions, especially in light of the Court’s 
solicitude for constitutional history in these areas.11 
 
8 572 U.S. at 860 (holding that a clear indication from Congress that the relevant federal statute 
was designed to supersede state law was necessary before the Court would interpret that federal 
statute as intruding on the states’ police power). 
9 Id. at 894-96 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal quotations marks and citations omitted). 
10 Id. at 896 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Bradley, supra note 5, at 402-409). 
11 Two caveats about scope: I focus here on the work product of lawyers, courts, and agencies 
debating public law questions posed by American treaty-making and the sovereignty of the insular 
possessions. Recent historical work on other aspects of American colonialism is vast and vibrant. See 
generally Paul A. Kramer, How Not to Write the History of U.S. Empire, 42 DIPLOMATIC HIST. 911 
(2018) (collecting books and dissertations on U.S. colonialism since 2007). Relatedly, I focus on one 
of two legal questions raised in the treaty-power debate: the scope of the treaty-making power and 
the plausibility of subjecting that power to a “subject-matter limitation.” I leave to one side the scope 
of Congress’s treaty-implementing power, which receives focused analysis elsewhere. See generally Jean 
Galbraith, Congress’s Treaty-Implementing Power in Historical Practice, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 54, 
62 (2014); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867, 1868 
(2005) (arguing that the capacious view of Congress’s treaty-implementing power set forth in 
Missouri v. Holland should be rejected); see also Bond, 572 U.S. at 876 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(adopting Professor Rosenkranz’s approach). 
Because my focus is trained on the use of an idea of American federalism in resolving debates 
about the foreign-affairs powers of the federal government, and ultimately the reframing of “our 
federalism” to accommodate imperial ends, I do not engage directly with the now-flourishing history 
of imperial constitutionalism. My focus on the constitutional debate about whether the acquisition 
power, the cession power, and the sovereign’s eminent dominion, are part of American “sovereignty,” 
is principally motivated by current debates about the federal government’s foreign-affairs powers 
and the extent to which these modern debates rest on a contingent settlement concerning the 
compatibility of imperial government with American federalism. Tracing the arc of that settlement 
does not displace the thought that the broad thrust of American ideological development during 
this period included a robust “settler” ideology, which entailed dispossession of indigenous peoples.  
See generally AZIZ RANA, THE TWO FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 12-13 (2010) (describing the 
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My aim in what follows is to chart the final ascendance—during precisely 
the episode of territorial acquisition in which Moore was lecturing—of an 
imperial idea of dual sovereignty in the foreign-affairs powers of the 
American republic. In doing so, I will show some of the compromises of our 
public law that underwrite modern views of the treaty-making power and the 
federal government’s special title to acquired territory. 
To preview that story, in the century before Moore delivered his history of 
our “imperial” phase, the notion that any American government could exercise 
a power to acquire, cede, and hold title to territory did cause plenty of 
sophisticated commentators to “grimace.”12 Their reactions stemmed from a 
credible view of foreign-affairs federalism that rivaled the now-dominant 
theory that the federal government may exercise all sovereign powers not 
reserved to the states, and especially the treaty powers necessary to practice 
imperial government. Instead, the rivals argued that the Constitution 
distributes some, but not all, of a sovereign’s powers at international law 
between the two principal American governments. Crucially, this theory drew 
on the law of nations to posit that with respect to the eminent dominion,13 the 
dormant popular sovereign (the people themselves) withheld from their 
governments the powers necessary to barter territory or grant title to it. 
 
role of settler ideology in American public law). Nor does my account shed light on the distinctive 
development of federal Indian law during this period. See Maggie Blackhawk, Federal Indian Law as 
Paradigm Within Public Law, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1787 (2019) (calling for a renewed focus on 
federal Indian law, and the “tragic history of colonialism and violent dispossession of Native lands” 
in understanding American constitutional development); see also id. at 1809-15 (applying this insight 
to the treaty-making power). And, finally, my account does not comprehensively address the vexed 
and still-open questions of status and self-government created by the Insular Cases and the theory of 
nonincorporated territory. See generally FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE (Christina Duffy Burnett 
& Burke Marshall eds., 2001); SAM ERMAN, ALMOST CITIZENS: PUERTO RICO, CONSTITUTION, 
AND EMPIRE (2018) (elaborating a comprehensive account of the status and naturalization questions 
created by the Spanish American War, and the partial resolution of those questions in the Insular 
Cases); see also id. at 163 n.4 (collecting scholarship concerning the “imperial turn,” especially in 
connection with territories acquired in the Spanish-American War); Christina Duffy Burnett, 
Untied States: American Expansion and Territorial Deannexation, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 797, 797-98 (2005) 
(advancing a “revised understanding” of the Insular Cases that emphasizes their installation of a 
“doctrine of territorial deannexation” in constitutional law).    
12 See MOORE, supra note 1, at 149. 
13 I adopt the nineteenth-century phrase “eminent dominion” to forestall the inaccurate 
reduction of the phrase “eminent domain” to the power of taking private property for public 
purposes. Instead, these debates concerned a capacious bundle of ideas received, somewhat 
haphazardly, from the law-of-nations literature. See JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES 6-9 (1888) (tracing the name “eminent domain” to the 
law of nations); James Bradley Thayer, The Right of Eminent Domain, Note, 19 MONTHLY L. REP. 
241 (1856); see also Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1696 n.13 
(2012) (citing Lewis’s treatise). By nineteenth-century lights, the eminent dominion encompassed 
the public powers of acquiring, ceding, and title to land, as well as more familiar rights such as 
exclusion and alienation. 
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As applied to the federal government’s power to make treaties, the rivals’ 
view of federalism—which I call throughout “popular-sovereign federalism” 
or “dual-government federalism” with reference to the Tenth Amendment’s 
text14—provided a workable principle that could limit the federal 
government’s foreign-affairs powers. For these proponents, the central 
inquiry was which powers the popular sovereign may legitimately delegate at 
all to its governmental agents under the law of nations. The law-of-nations 
idea of eminent dominion yielded an answer to that inquiry: because 
acquisition and cession impermissibly modify the constitutive relationship 
between the popular sovereign and its governments, no mere government 
could exercise these powers. Because acquiring or ceding territory by treaty 
would alter the composition of the republic, these exercises of sovereignty 
were denied to all American governments. Lawful acquisition or cession could 
only proceed by somehow awakening the popular sovereign and involving it 
in the treaty-making process.15 
Such limitations on the treaty-making power do not, by contrast, follow 
from the dual-sovereign theory of foreign-affairs federalism, which would 
attempt to allocate all powers of acquiring and ceding territory between the 
federal and state sovereigns. The dual-sovereign approach to the treaty-making 
power has foundered for more than a century in identifying some criterion that 
might sort the “domestic” from the “international,” or the “police power” from 
the “foreign-affairs power,” in order to divide the powers among the sovereigns. 
That effort can, moreover, be defeated by the rejoinder that state governments 
lack the international legal personality necessary to make treaties with other 
sovereigns about plainly urgent “domestic” concerns.16 Indeed, on the question 
of acquisition and cession, dual-sovereign federalism yields the least satisfying 
account of the treaty power’s limits: treaties accomplishing acquisition and 
cession—especially those that purchase peace—are quintessentially 
“international,” while also altering the relationship between citizens and their 
government in utterly fundamental ways. Such treaties change the balance of 
power between states composing the federal union, dilute the existing states’ 
suffrage in the Senate, and modify the composition of “the people.” 
Remarkably, popular-sovereign limitations on the treaty-making power 
survived long into our constitutional history and proved decisive in several 
episodes of constitutional lawmaking.17 But the popular-sovereign federalism 
theory has now been lost to orthodox constitutional history. We are left, instead, 
 
14 U.S. CONST. amend. X (providing that “powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution . . . are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people”). 
15 See infra Section II.A. 
16 See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 54–56 (discussing Sutherland’s defense of a 
nationalist treaty-making power). 
17 See infra Part II. 
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with a history motivated by a dual-sovereign view. This history assumed a 
narrow frame for the treaty-power disputes, in service of an early-twentieth-
century project of imperial government. The legacy of that imperial project 
continues to animate some of the Supreme Court’s most-watched cases in the 
past few Terms, including Bond v. United States and Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle.18 
This Article provides an in-depth account of how the claims of the 
popular-sovereign’s treaty power, particularly its limitation on American 
governments’ capacity to exercise the eminent dominion, have been relegated 
from a central situs of partisan conflict to the implausible fringes of public 
law. The canonical erasure of this idea came at the hands of a generation of 
bureaucrats and law professors who were committed to defending territorial 
acquisition and imperial government over the insular territories. Although 
the Insular Bureau, the State Department, powerful American states, and 
land-office bureaucrats had sometimes embraced the idea that that popular 
sovereignty could limit the government’s foreign-affairs powers, this theory 
is now a casualty of our imperial ambitions. 
As I argue here, the purging of popular-sovereign federalism from the 
intellectual history of American public law matters for two reasons. The first is 
connected to the partisan disputes that were pivotal in shaping U.S. territory. 
That is to say, in debating about the American governments’ “eminent 
dominion,” vel non, partisans touched upon fundamental questions about the 
composition of the popular sovereign, its relationship to federal and state 
governments, and the place of public and private international law in American 
public law. These debates coursed through questions about acquiring new 
territory (augmenting the popular sovereign), ceding territory (dilacerating 
some of the popular sovereign), and the lucrative question of title to public land. 
Second, the decline of popular-sovereign federalism has been a loss for 
modern battlegrounds that are still active. We have been left with the history, 
and the ideas, of the winners. As I will show, this history domesticated some 
parts of the nineteenth-century international law canon to serve imperial 
ends, shoring up the foreign-affairs powers needed to acquire the insular 
possessions and to subject them to the sovereignty of Congress. At virtually 
the same time that the imperial histories of the treaty power were being 
popularized, a closely-related fight over whether the state or federal sovereign 
exercised an “eminent dominion” over possessions acquired by treaty was 
briefed and decided by the Supreme Court in Missouri v. Holland.19 These 
briefs are the final exemplar of the vocabulary of eminent dominion that is 
now purged from public law, and the Court’s decision remains a central 
preoccupation of foreign-affairs federalism. 
 
18 136 S. Ct. 1863 (2016). 
19 See Brief of Appellant, Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (No. 609). 
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Taken together, the fight over the eminent dominion and the victory of 
imperialist bureaucrats illuminate the ways in which ideas about American 
public law both bound and are bounded by partisanship. This history also 
demonstrates a long-running and richly textured process by which the law of 
nations was brought into domestic law. During this period, the boundary, so 
to speak, between public and private law, and between American public law 
and international public law, was especially porous. Accordingly, with respect 
to the treaty-power questions taken up in Missouri v. Holland and revived once 
again in Bond v. United States just six years ago, this history discloses a road 
once taken and now almost entirely forgotten. 
This purged constitutional history sheds an altogether different light on 
recurring questions about the federal government’s foreign-affairs powers and 
the peculiar status of the American sovereign’s title to acquired territory. 
Indeed, the old debates are illuminating precisely because modern federal 
courts, and especially the Supreme Court, have become distinctively 
historicist when they make doctrinal choices in cases where foreign affairs and 
our federalism meet.20 To the extent these modern doctrinal choices assume 
a constitutional history that speaks with one voice, they wager our public law 
on risky foundations. If, indeed, some of our received constitutional histories 
from the early-twentieth century were in fact motivated glosses—made in the 
jaws of an imperial enterprise—the received history does not offer a neutral 
principle to settle our hard cases. History instead offers familiar 
constitutional politics dressed, by the victors, in the garb of inevitability. If 
the apparent inevitability claimed by these histories represents, instead, utter 
contingency—or worse, an imperial politics that modern minds might 
abhor—it is important to see such contingency clearly, and to acknowledge 
our acquiescence in it before building a modern public law upon it. 
This Article demonstrates the imperial erasure of popular-sovereign 
federalism from American foreign-affairs law, and the modern consequences 
of that erasure, in three Parts. 
Part I sets the stage for the central nineteenth-century debates about 
federal power to acquire and cede land. The theory that a dormant, popular 
sovereign inherently limits the federal government’s foreign-affairs powers 
was still live and effective in constraining politics during this period. 
Moreover, this theory embraced a concept of civil power that interacted in 
 
20 See infra Part III (discussing modern courts’ use of imperial constitutional histories in 
resolving treaty-power and territories questions); see also Galbraith, supra note 11, at 62 (noting that 
the treaty-power debate that has occupied the Court and scholars over the past two decades has 
grown to “include substantial consideration of other principles of constitutional interpretation, most 
notably the historical practice of the political branches and precedents based upon this practice”); 
cf. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 525 (2014) (noting that “the longstanding ‘practice of the 
government’ can inform our determination of ‘what the law is’” (citations omitted)). 
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novel ways with the ambient international public law. Most conspicuously, in 
insisting that the dual state and federal governments are ministerial agents of 
the popular sovereign, federalism provided a vocabulary to resist the idea that 
any American government could lay claim to a sovereign’s “eminent 
dominion” from the law of nations. On this view, the eminent dominion—
that is, the private and public rights and powers called the eminent dominion 
in the law of nations—and not an amorphous category of “domestic” or 
“police” powers, was reserved from the national government’s treaty-making 
power by the last clause of the Tenth Amendment. 
Part II traces the opposing theories of dual-sovereign federalism and 
popular-sovereign (or “dual-government”) federalism in the hands of 
advocates with opposing views on the eminent dominion, as well as opposing 
views on title to land acquired using that power. I argue that the battles 
between these constitutional partisans yielded incommensurable outcomes 
that remain suspended in contradiction in American foreign-affairs law. 
These battles were put to rest by the now-canonical constitutional histories 
written to support our imperial government, but some artifacts of judicial 
decisionmaking during the earlier period have lingered to become misleading 
fodder for modern constitutional argument. 
Part III first assesses the imperial reframing of foreign-affairs federalism 
as a question of dual sovereignty. Here, I describe the influence that the old 
eminent-dominion disputes about acquisition and cession exert upon modern 
reasoning about the structural principles of our foreign-affairs public law. In 
particular, I contend that popular-sovereign federalism and the fight over the 
eminent dominion remained open questions at least until the last era of 
imperial acquisition—an era that included Missouri v. Holland. At that time, in 
response to considerable energy invested by constitutional historians, public 
intellectuals, and courts, it finally became canonical that any and all sovereign 
powers described by the law of nations were distributed between the federal 
and state governments, not reserved to the popular sovereign. It thus became 
natural to assert that (1) all powers exercised by other sovereigns must be 
allocated to some American government; (2) those powers enabled an imperial 
mode of government; and (3) the sovereign exercising those powers should 
almost always be the federal government. As the most prominent 
constitutional law professor wrote in 1899: “What Spain could do we can do.”21 
Part III then proposes present-day extensions of the material unearthed 
in the prior Parts. I first take on the historical claims underlying several 
Justices’ recent effort in Bond v. United States to limit the federal government’s 
foreign-affairs powers by invoking the public law of the nineteenth century—
 
21 Letter from James Bradley Thayer to Moorfield Storey 2 (Oct. 27, 1899) (on file with 
Harvard Law School Historical and Special Collections). 
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such as discerning a workable distinction between “domestic” and 
“international” treaties.22 On the contrary, the approach the concurring 
Justices advanced in Bond would actually yield no defensible principle that 
attends to the modern structure of the American republic. Treaty-making in 
the nineteenth-century republic was prone to exercises of power that were 
quite municipally invasive. Treaties of acquisition and cession touched 
concerns no less “domestic” than the composition of the federal union and 
the lucrative title to public land composing the federal fisc. For related 
reasons, however, the dormant idea of popular-sovereign federalism offers no 
alternative: in part because of its fraught history and in part because of 
methodological innovations in international (but not American) public law, 
popular-sovereign federalism is now unimaginably implausible. The bell of 
the imperial treaty-making power cannot be unrung. 
By contrast, there are good reasons to reject the modern Supreme Court’s 
parsing of this history in answering new questions about the imperial 
territories’ political status. I argue that the Court’s recent attempt in Puerto 
Rico v. Sanchez Valle to distinguish between the “sovereign” statuses of the 
insular territories and the new (post-Founding) states is, by its own lights, 
dubious. To the extent the “historical	.	.	.	wellsprings”23 of state sovereignty 
are relevant to determining the status of territories acquired pursuant to 
treaty, historical methods of constitutional interpretation suggest that the 
new states’ claim to membership in the union was just as politically fraught 
as that of the insular territories. Neither the structure of the Constitution nor 
the nineteenth-century law of nations disclosed anything obvious about the 
juridical status of either the new states or the insular possessions: their status 
has from their inception been marked by bureaucrats’ conviction that our 
imperialism was a fait accompli. 
The Article concludes by resisting the thought that the old roads not taken 
in our foreign-affairs federalism should be revived. Some forgotten roads, as 
with the popular-sovereign critique of the treaty-making power, cannot be 
walked anew. Others, as with the political status of the insular possessions, 
are so overdetermined by the fact of imperialism that modern courts should 
reject historicist approaches altogether. I thus observe that the principal 
lesson to be gleaned from the public law of prior eras is that the effort to 
revive the partisan federalisms of the past is no substitute for coming to 
constitutional judgments by our own lights. 
 
22 See Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 867-82 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) (contending 
that the federal government’s treaty-making power, properly understood, has always been limited to 
issues of genuine international concern, such as international commerce, diplomacy, and war); id. at 
882-96 (Thomas, J., concurring) (same); id. at 896-97 (Alito, J., concurring) (same). 
23  Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1871. 
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I. IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS 
This Part describes the intellectual apparatus built by nineteenth-century 
partisans to answer two public law disputes before the Marshall and Taney 
Courts: the power to acquire and cede land, and title to land within the states. 
Neither power is expressly granted to the federal government; both were the 
objects of decades of sophisticated constitutional argument; and both caused 
lawyers and courts to draw upon a law-of-nations canon to claim or disclaim 
the marks, prerogatives, eminent powers, and majesties of sovereigns. 
During this period our federalisms were plural, and the thought that the 
people distributed all sovereign powers to their two governments—i.e., that 
the Tenth Amendment stops at the comma following “reserved to the states”—
was not yet obvious. Indeed, neither the power to acquire nor the power to 
convey title to land emerged from this period as a power reserved to the states, 
as the modern reading of the Tenth Amendment might suggest. But the 
conclusion that the federal government possesses some version of these powers 
has served, for more than a century-and-a-half, as a stalking horse for broader 
debates about the contours of American foreign-affairs federalism. 
The claim that the treaty power implies the power to acquire and cede 
territory, and the claim that the sovereignty of the federal government 
permits it to convey title to public lands, continually recur in the intellectual 
history of American federalism. Accordingly, the acquisition and cession 
powers remain issues that, like many similar issues arising under the 
Constitution’s sparse regulation of our governments’ foreign-affairs powers, 
“continue to cry for understanding.”24 The constitutional politics of this 
period thus became the genesis of a permanent confusion in the theory of 
American federalism. That is because to answer the puzzle of an implied 
federal power to acquire and cede land, partisans and courts drew the law-of-
nations language of eminent dominion into the American theory of 
government and searched for a sovereign to which they could attach these 
law-of-nations powers. The problems of acquisition, cession, and original title 
to territory were thus all taken to ask a blended question of public 
constitutional and international law: what is the eminent dominion and which 
government can claim it? 
The following Part describes these aged vocabularies of political thought, 
which came together in the acquisition, cession, and title debates of the mid- 
to late-nineteenth century. 
 
24 LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ix (2d ed. 1996). 
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A. Sovereign Federalisms 
Claims about American federalism are almost invariably inflected through 
claims about the intellectual history of American sovereignty. Indeed, the 
terms “sovereignty” and “government” are used more or less interchangeably 
in the Supreme Court’s modern federalism jurisprudence.25 The 
identification of state and federal governments with “sovereignty” is so 
dominant that a new generation of federalism scholarship aims to move 
“beyond” sovereignty, with “dual” sovereignty as the point of departure.26 
Yet, as explained in his recent Seeley lectures, Richard Tuck has called 
attention to the “novelty” of the American idea that a “sovereign legislator” 
called the People “has an institutional shape but is usually dormant.”27 By way 
of example, the difference between the sovereign and its governments can be 
perceived in widely quoted28 letters published during the ratification debates. 
The first, Federalist 39, aimed to give comfort about the new Constitution by 
explaining that “the proposed government cannot be deemed a national one; 
since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves 
to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other 
objects.”29 The second, Federalist 46, was published two weeks later and 
critiqued “gentlemen” who viewed the proposed state and federal 
 
25 See, e.g., Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 542-43 (2013) (deriving, from the idea of 
state sovereignty, a principle of “equal footing” that would limit the federal government’s power to 
regulate voting); Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011) (“Federalism is more than an exercise 
in setting the boundary between different institutions of government for their own integrity. ‘State 
sovereignty is not just an end in itself: Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive 
from the diffusion of sovereign power.’” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Northwest 
Austin v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009) (“The Act also differentiates between the States, despite 
our historic tradition that all the States enjoy ‘equal sovereignty.’” (citations omitted)); see also generally 
Gregory Ablavsky, Empire States: The Coming of Dual Federalism, 128 YALE L.J. 1792 (2019) (critiquing 
the modern Supreme Court’s “dual-sovereign” conceit and describing a history of American 
federalism focused on the centralization of authority in the state and federal governments). 
26 See Heather Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7, 44, 71 
(2010) (urging both “nationalists” and “federalists” to “move beyond sovereignty”); see also Jessica 
Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1259 (2009) 
(analyzing states’ propensity to defy the federal government under the theory of federalism); Abbe 
R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996 (2014) (emphasizing the role of states 
notwithstanding Congress’s dominance in prevailing accounts of in U.S. federalism). An earlier 
wave of scholarship following Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), similarly endeavored to 
modernize the vocabulary of federalism so that it could move beyond “dual sovereignty” with, for 
example, the idea of “autonomy.” See, e.g., Roderick Hills, State Autonomy, 96 MICH. L. REV. 815, 
832-55 (1998) (critiquing the “modern doctrine of state autonomy” on the basis that the doctrine was 
still tethered to notions of dual federalism). 
27 RICHARD TUCK, THE SLEEPING SOVEREIGN 252 (2015). 
28 Compare Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-19 (1997) (quoting THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 39 (James Madison)), with Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71, 76 (1868) (quoting THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison)). 
29 THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 256 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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governments “not only as mutual rivals and enemies, but as uncontrolled by 
any common superior in their efforts to usurp the authorities of each other.”30 
Madison countered that “the ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may 
be found, resides in the people alone	.	.	.	.”31 These two letters frame a long-
vexed problem in defining American federalism and describing how the 
government should exercise civil power: in what sense is the state or federal 
government “sovereign”—if at all? 
In what follows, I argue that the principle that the “people” are the true 
sovereign helps to explain the forgotten language of federalism that arose in 
the debate over the federal government’s eminent dominion. 
1. Federalism as a Contest of Sovereigns 
Most court-authored explanations of “our federalism” embody a split-the-
baby approach to the Constitution’s distribution of powers: the federal 
government and the states are sovereign within their “spheres.” This “basic” 
“dual federalism”32 theory ends at the last comma of the Tenth Amendment: 
whatever powers are neither delegated to the federal government nor 
prohibited to the states are reserved to the states (full stop). 
On this theory, the special genius of the Constitution is that it “split the 
atom”33 of sovereignty between—and only between—the federal government 
and the states. “States are not mere political subdivisions of the United 
States	.	.	.	. The Constitution . . . ‘leaves to the several States a residuary and 
inviolable sovereignty,’ reserved explicitly . . . by the Tenth Amendment.”34 
Thus, dual-sovereignty apportions sovereignty between the federal and state 
governments, preserving the residual sovereignty of the latter. 
The dual sovereignty thesis has had special traction in modern debates 
about powers implied by the Constitution’s more capacious grants of civil 
power, such as the treaty-making power or the Necessary and Proper Clause.35 
 
30 THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 294 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
31 Id. 
32 See Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1950) (defining 
“dual federalism” as a national government reduced to enumerated powers, in tension with equally 
sovereign state governments). 
33 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
34 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 
245 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
35 See Bradley, supra note 6, at 434-36 (examining the sources of the “purported immunity of the 
treaty power from federalism limitations”); see also Corwin, supra note 32, at 17 (describing the “New 
Court” of the New-Deal era as leaving “the Federal System	. . .	in ruins” by extracting a “latitudinarian 
construction of the ‘necessary and proper’ clause” notwithstanding “the State Police Power”). 
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Indeed, most contexts in which powers are said to inhere in “sovereignty” 
usually incorporate some version of dual-sovereign federalism.36 
2. Federalism as a Contest of Governments 
Counterpoised to dual-sovereign federalism is the classical republican 
view: in framing their Constitution, the people vested their sovereignty in 
neither government. Instead, “the supreme, absolute and uncontrollable power 
resides in the people at large; . . . they have vested certain proportions of this 
power in the state governments; but . . . the fee-simple continues, resides and 
remains, with the body of the people.”37 While the state governments are 
“prominent features of the system,”38 in truth the Constitution commits to the 
“original and supreme authority”39 of the people. The popular-sovereign view 
of federalism reads the Tenth Amendment to its end: only the people may lay 
claim to the full measure of sovereign prerogatives exercised by other nations. 
The popular sovereign, even when dormant, thus has a juridical shape: the 
popular sovereign reserves to itself those powers that remain un-delegated to 
either the state or federal governments. 
Before proceeding, it is worth noting—as the following pages will 
demonstrate—that the popular-sovereign view of federalism does not tend to 
an obvious ideological valence. On this contest-of-governments view of 
American federalism, the placement of sovereignty in either government is 
equally pernicious: a sovereign federal government is as odious as sovereign 
states.40 Take, by way of example, the alignment between the politics and 
constitutional theory of John Taylor of Caroline, Chief Justice Marshall’s 
“most pertinacious critic.”41 
Taylor argued for a popular-sovereign, dual-government theory of 
federalism precisely to attack Chief Justice Marshall’s “heavy” federal 
government.42 Taylor viewed sovereign states as anathema and urged 
constitutional lawyers to be “vigilant custom-house officer[s]” to prevent a 
 
36 See, e.g., Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1066-67 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(describing states’ power to regulate water use as “an essential attribute of [state] sovereignty” or 
“pre-existing sovereign rights” (citation omitted)). 
37 James Wilson, Speech (Dec. 4, 1787), reprinted in 4 AM. L.J. 359, 364 (1813). 
38 Id. at 368. 
39 Id. at 366. 
40 See, e.g., Simeon Eben Baldwin, Lecture V (1899) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
Yale MSSA, Group 55, Series VI, Box 103, Folder 1088) (“This relation of the U.S. to the States 
makes each of them always an imperium in imperio—a source of weakness & danger. We—the U.S.—
are more in danger from invasion of our rights by a State than by a foreign power. . . . No force can 
be applied vs. a State.	.	.	. We can only appeal to slow processes of suits in Gov’t . . . .”). 
41 Corwin, supra note 32, at 7. 
42 Id. 
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foreign idea of sovereignty from invading American institutions.43 He 
especially hated that the language of sovereignty had “crept into our political 
dialect,” and sovereignty’s “unknown powers,” described in varied and 
ambiguous ways in the law-of-nations literature, now “tickle[d] the mind” of 
constitutional lawyers “with hopes and fears.”44 Instead, an “indefinite word” 
of sovereignty had become the “traitor of civil rights” and “transfer[ed] 
sovereignty from the people	.	.	.	to their own servants.”45 In Taylor’s view, 
“neither of the[] governments can legitimately acquire any species of 
sovereignty at all, because it would be contrary to the conventional 
sovereignty actually established.”46 The popular sovereign—neither the states 
nor the federal government—is the true sovereign. 
Taylor was also the most clear-eyed early theorist to identify the tendency 
of his adversaries’ dual-sovereign brand of federalism to domesticate into 
American law a set of public law principles loosely defined by the law of 
nations. In a passage that foreboded the constitutional battles that are the 
focus of the remainder of this Article, Taylor criticized the tendency of those 
who speak of “sovereignty” to use the “laws of nations” to make constitutional 
arguments. He lambasted the “great ingenuity” of those who had used the 
“formidable phalanx” of international law to enlarge the implied sovereign 
powers of the people’s governments.47 The law of nations had been 
conscripted to the “wicked design	.	.	.	of increasing domestick oppression” by 
those who wished to argue that American “governments were invested with 
sovereignty.”48 That “wicked design” would allow powers to be inferred from 
the “powers of sovereignty,” until the people’s governments become 
“unlimited” in their enumerated powers.49 Correctly understood, Taylor 
argued, American federalism ensured that international lawyers could not 
“find a sovereignty to receive their bounty” in the United States—that is to 
say, lawyers who would make use of sovereignty-oriented claims about 
American public law could not identify a sovereign government to which law-
of-nations theories of public law might apply.50 
As I explain in the next Section, the now-defunct grammar of 
constitutional argument that Taylor identified, and the mid-nineteenth-
century effort that Taylor observed to domesticate the law of nations into 
 
43 JOHN TAYLOR, CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUED, AND CONSTITUTIONS VINDICATED 2 
(Richmond, Shepherd & Pollard 1820). 
44 Id. at 25. 
45 Id. at 26. 
46 Id. at 36. 
47 Id. at 279. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 281. 
50 Id. at 282. 
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American public law, are critical to understanding the ways in which 
principles of federalism were embodied, extended, and eclipsed51 in the din 
of nineteenth-century constitutional battles over land. This was a fight over 
which sovereign—state, federal, or popular—holds the eminent dominion. In 
fits and starts in the mid-nineteenth century, and then completely by the early 
twentieth, American lawyers who aimed to acquire territory did in fact assign 
the federal government a “sovereignty” to “receive the bounty” of the law of 
nations. 
B. “Receiving the Bounty” of the Law of Nations 
A century after Taylor’s writing, the “unknown powers” provided by the 
law of nations became central features of foreign-affairs federalism. I consider 
two: the conservation-of-powers thesis and the eminent dominion. 
1. The Conservation-of-Powers Thesis 
One important principle of modern constitutional law often travels with 
dual-sovereign federalism, though less frequently with popular-sovereign 
federalism. Call it the “conservation of powers” thesis.52 The conservation-
of-powers thesis advances the claim that “division of the sum total of 
legislative powers between a ‘general government’, on the one hand, and the 
‘States’, on the other” must be complete.53 On the conservation-of-powers 
thesis, no plausible interpretation of the Constitution may leave a useful 
sovereign power undistributed to at least one of the American governments. 
The illustration of the conservation-of-powers thesis that is most 
recognizable to modern debates was written by Senator George Sutherland, 
who wrote in 1910 that 
Vattel had written in 1758, and this [the framers] read: ‘Whatever is lawful 
for one nation is equally lawful for another; and whatever is unjustifiable in 
 
51 See Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Constitutional Ideas: The 
Intellectual History Alternative to Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 725-33 (2013) (describing the 
growth of intellectual history in American constitutional history as an effort to illuminate 
constitutionalism outside of the courts, and to focus on “men and women thinking: making, 
consuming, and remaking ideas and language” (quoting Daniel T. Rodgers, Thinking in Verbs, 18 
INTELL. HIST. NEWSL. 21, 21-22 (1996)). 
52 I name the thesis the “conservation of powers,” but I am far from the first to notice the 
constitutional argument. For more on the argument that powers not residing with the states must 
reside in the federal government or not exist at all, see, for example, HENKIN, supra note 24, at 20; 
Sarah H. Cleveland, The Plenary Power Background of Curtiss-Wright, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1127 
(1999); G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 VA. 
L. REV. 1, 5 (1999) (collecting examples of the argument that proving the absence of a power in the 
states is sufficient to prove its presence in the federal government). 
53 Corwin, supra note 32, at 3. 
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the one is equally so in the other.’ With this knowledge [the framers] 
introduced the United States of America into the family of nations, to be 
governed by the law of nations.54 
The claim that Sutherland, and others, was advancing in order to domesticate 
the law of nations into American public law is worth defining with precision. 
Although dual-sovereign federalism does not, strictly speaking, entail the 
conservation of powers, the affinity is clear enough: if the federal and state 
governments are sovereigns within their spheres, and the state sovereign holds 
the remainder of sovereignty, then the Constitution must have distributed 
every conceivable power between the two governments (apart from those 
expressly withheld by the Constitution’s text). 
The conservation-of-powers thesis can do difficult work in making 
arguments about the Constitution’s distribution of public power. Indeed, the 
thesis supplied the following truism to a generation of constitutional lawyers: 
“Under the constitution of the United States, all possible powers must be found 
in the Union or the states, or else they remain among those reserved rights which 
the people have retained, as not essential to be vested in any government.”55 This 
imperative—to find all essential powers in our governments—can surmount even 
the last clause of the Tenth Amendment: “[I]f that which is essential to 
government is prohibited to one, it must, of necessity, be found in the other; and 
the prohibition, in such case, on the one side, is equivalent to a grant on the 
other.”56 The operative textual rule is thus: the express or implied denial of a 
power to one government amounts to a grant to the other. 
This 1865 description of the conservation-of-powers thesis is important 
because its author, Judge James Valentine Campbell, taught Michigan’s 
constitutional law course when George Sutherland received his training in 
the law there.57 Sutherland would, as a Supreme Court Justice, come to 
 
54 George Sutherland, The Internal and External Powers of the National Government, 191 N. AM. 
REV. 373, 381 (1910). 
55 Van Husan v. Kanouse, 13 Mich. 303, 312-13 (1865). 
56 Id. at 313. 
57 See Sutherland, supra note 54, at 386 (quoting Van Husan and describing Campbell as a jurist 
“whose historical and legal learning has been seldom excelled in this country”); see also HADLEY 
ARKES, THE RETURN OF GEORGE SUTHERLAND 42-43 (1994) (explaining Campbell’s influence); 
Marshall Davis Ewell, Notes Taken From Lectures Given by Ashley Pond and J.V. Campbell, 1866–
1868, at 7 (Dec. 17, 1866) [hereinafter Ewell’s Campbell Notes] (on file with Bentley Historical 
Library, University of Michigan) (“The jurisdiction of the U.S. government is of three classes: first 
all external jurisdiction, second jurisdiction relative to all domestic matters relating to more than a 
single state; third all matters that can not be safely intrusted to local jurisdiction without imperiling 
the peace & harmony of the states.”). In light of the coronavirus pandemic, the editors were unable 
to obtain a copy of the Ewell source to confirm its contents before press.  
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elevate Campbell’s theory into law.58 For Campbell and then for Sutherland, 
American governments must “possess every power that has been found to be 
absolutely necessary to all other nations.”59 No matter the interpretive 
niceties, any theory of the Constitution must “portion[] out all the possible 
powers to the general and state governments.”60 
And indeed, as a Senator, Sutherland sharpened Campbell’s theory into a 
thorough rejection of popular-sovereign federalism. He argued that “[t]o say 
that the power is not destroyed but is reserved to the people does not meet the 
difficulty. Such a reserved power is in effect no power.	.	.	.	A power reserved to 
the people is not come-at-able; it cannot be translated into action.”61 Sutherland 
thus rejected popular-sovereign federalism and its focus on the last clause of 
the Tenth Amendment in defining the distribution of sovereignty within the 
American republic: “We must assume that no necessary or beneficial power was 
intentionally withheld . . . , but that the powers reserved to the people were 
only such as they were capable or desirous of themselves exercising or were 
unnecessary to the operations of government . . . .”62 
In Sutherland’s hands, the conservation-of-powers thesis would become a 
bedrock principle of a foreign-affairs federalism that committed our 
Constitution to a theory of dual sovereignty. From the idea that “the 
consequence of denying to the general government any specified power over 
external affairs is to preclude its exercise by governmental agency altogether”63 
one conclusion quickly followed: “all necessary power over external affairs 
should be vested in the National Government . . . .”64 In denying foreign-
affairs powers to the states, Article I, Section 10, according to Sutherland’s 
conservation-of-powers thesis, entails the plenary grant of that power to the 
federal sovereign. The conservation-of-powers thesis has since become a 
central feature of modern foreign-affairs federalism. 
Yet, as I have argued, views on the conservation-of-powers thesis were not 
fixed before Sutherland’s era. I focus in what follows on an especially knotty 
question that drew partisans into warring about the popular-sovereign, dual-
sovereign, and conservation-of-powers ideas: do American governments 
possess the eminent dominion? 
 
58 See Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the 
Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 277 (2002) [hereinafter 
Cleveland, Powers Inherent] (“Sutherland’s 1919 variation on [Judge Campbell’s] essay largely tracked 
the same argument, though it asserted that the Territory Clause provided no power to govern territories 
(e.g., the power must be inherent) and updated the argument to include the Insular Cases.”). 
59 Ewell’s Campbell Notes, supra note 57, at 13 (emphasis added). 
60 Id. (emphasis added). 
61 Sutherland, supra note 54, at 380. 
62 Id. at 381. 
63 Id. at 375. 
64 Id. at 378. 
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2. The American Eminent Dominion 
Like any serviceable property concept, the “eminent domain” entered 
American law as a confused bundle of ideas, replete with a complex intellectual 
history. Early constitutional reasoning about the eminent domain—or, as I 
shall call the broader idea, the “eminent dominion”—was marked by a partisan 
reception of the idea from a broad and vibrant law-of-nations literature. 
For example, the nineteenth-century law student learned that the takings 
power had to be borrowed from the law of nations because the state and 
federal constitutions “do not gen[erally] . . . use the phrase ‘em. dom.’”65 The 
term, as those students were taught, originated with the law-of-nations 
publicist Grotius, “and imports supreme or ultimate property or control.”66 
The last few words of Grotius’s description—“ultimate property or 
control”—suggest the central conceptual difficulty (and consequent 
opportunity) facing constitutional lawyers who wished to domesticate this 
idea of the eminent dominion into American law. The idea defined by Grotius 
contained multitudes: in Grotius’s hands, the eminent domain describes both 
a power over property and a right of dominion in that property. 
Despite Grotius’s uncontroversial claim that the eminent dominion 
includes a sovereign’s takings power,67 motivated readers of the law-of-nations 
canon could pluck a number of disparate claims from his elaborate description 
of the idea. First, Grotius’s rendition permitted partisans to use “eminent 
domain” as a stand in for “power,” tout court. Sutherland’s favorite publicist 
Vattel, for example, wrote that “when the nation takes possession of a country, 
the property of certain things is [then] allowed to individuals only with th[e 
sovereign’s] reserve [of eminent domain].”68 The people thus must 
presumptively “yield[] to [the sovereign] the eminent domain.”69 Second, 
because Grotius argued that the sovereign’s takings power flowed from the 
sovereign’s original property right, several publicists and constitutional 
 
65 James Bradley Thayer, Lectures on Constitutional Law, at 100 (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with Harvard Law School Library). 
66 Id. Thayer quoted Grotius in his seminal work on the eminent domain, arguing that a review 
of the law of nations “will bring out the conceptions . . . which the framers of our first constitutions 
entertained” regarding the takings power. 1 JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, CASES ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 945 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1895). 
67 See HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 1556 (Richard Tuck ed., Liberty 
Fund 2005) (1625) (“[T]he State has an eminent Right of Property over the Goods of the Subjects, 
so that the State, or those that represent it, may make Use of them, and even destroy and alienate 
them, . . . for the publick Benefit . . . .”). 
68 M. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS: OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE; 
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 173 (New York, 
Samuel Campbell 1796). 
69 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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lawyers thought that the eminent dominion was simply shorthand for a 
sovereign’s exclusive control and jurisdiction over territory.70 
Indeed, the title-oriented theory of the sovereign’s eminent dominion 
recurred in the classic nineteenth-century treatments of title to territory in 
public international law. Wheaton’s Elements of International Law, for example, 
explained that “[t]his national proprietary right, so far as it excludes that of 
other nations, is absolute; but in respect to the members of the state 
it . . .	forms what is called the eminent domain.”71 Similarly, when Thomas 
Rutherforth delivered an influential course of lectures on public law, he 
explained that “[a] n[a]tion by settling upon any tract of land, . . . acquires, 
in respect of all other nations, an exclusive right of full or absolute 
property . . . . This absolute property of a nation, in what it has thus seized 
upon, is its right of territory.”72 And, by the late-nineteenth century, Thomas 
Woolsey lectured his Yale students on the “Territorial Rights of States.” After 
noting that “[a] nation exists within certain territory,” he likewise noted that 
a nation “has jurisd[iction] over its subjects” and “has the domin. eminens.”73 
Unlike his forebears, however, Woolsey rejected the idea that the “domin. 
eminens” arose because “th[e] state was the original proprietor of the soil.”74 
Instead, Woolsey would argue that the “true” justification for the “domin. 
eminens” is the more familiar idea that “there are rights of all which affect 
land” that might overcome any individual proprietor’s rights.75 Just a few 
moments later, however, Woolsey’s lecture contended that “a govt [sic] may 
not sell or give away its subjects prop. or even alienate a part of territory 
without the inhabitants consent.” 76 
I highlight Woolsey’s limitation of the sovereign’s prerogative to cede 
territory for two reasons. It not only underscores the extent to which 
sovereignty, takings, and cession were all closely related aspects of the 
eminent dominion,77 but it also demonstrates the extent to which Americans 
 
70 See, e.g., Beekman v. Saratoga & Schenectady R.R., 3 Paige Ch. 45, 73 (N.Y. Ch. 1831) (“[T]he 
eminent domain, the highest and most exact idea of property, remains in the government, or in the 
aggregate body of the people in their sovereign capacity . . . .”); Lindsay v. East Bay St. Comm’rs, 1 
S.C.L. (1 Bay) 38, 56 (S.C. 1796) (recognizing how “eminent civilians and jurists” interpret the 
power to “appropriate a portion of the soil of every country for public roads and highways” as part 
of “the original rights of sovereignty” within “the authority of the state”). 
71 HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 137 (Philadelphia, Carey, Lea & 
Blanchard 1836) (emphasis omitted). 
72 2 THOMAS RUTHERFORTH, INSTITUTES OF NATURAL LAW 455 (Philadelphia, William 
Young 1799). 
73 Thomas D. Woolsey, Woolsey Family Papers A (unpublished lecture notes) (on file with 
Yale MSSA, Group 562, Series II, Box 45, No 193). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at B. 
76 Id. 
77 RUTHERFORTH, supra note 72, at 456-57. 
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inherited the entirety of these confused definitions of the eminent dominion 
from the law-of-nations canon. 
The confusion surrounding the eminent dominion’s conflated treatment 
of a sovereign’s takings power with original title was excellent fodder for 
constitutional politics. 
Indeed, the limitation that Woolsey conveyed to his students—that 
republics may not barter territory without the inhabitants’ consent—
encapsulated a hard-fought dispute about the treaty power that has now 
vanished from the constitutional canon. As Woolsey’s lectures suggest, a 
critical U.S. public law dispute about the power to exchange territory with 
other sovereigns caused partisans to mobilize the law-of-nations idea of the 
eminent dominion.78 That is because some publicists in the law-of-nations 
canon, such as Grotius, considered the acquisition and cession powers to 
follow from the eminent dominion, and sometimes concluded that sovereigns 
lack the power to cede their territory to other sovereigns without the consent 
of the ceded “part.”79 Grotius was certain of this limit because he thought that 
the compacts that create governments could “never be reasonably imagined 
to . . . invest the Body with a Power to cut off its own Members whenever it 
pleases, and to subject them to the Dominion of another.”80 On the other 
hand, several later publicists, such as Vattel, argued that when it came to “the 
cession of a town or province,” the nation “has a right to cut them off from 
the body[ i]f the public safety requires it.”81 For Vattel, “the cession ought to 
remain valid as to the state, since it hath a right to make it . . . .”82 In short, 
the sovereign’s eminent dominion included original title, permitting the 
sovereign to get and spend territory at will. 
The mid-nineteenth-century student at Harvard Law School was assigned 
all of these materials—Grotius, Vattel, and Rutherforth—as core texts in the 
“Law of Nations” and left to puzzle over the definition of the “eminent 
domain”—an idea that would become a significant focus of American public 
law in the century that followed.83 The first clear-eyed American treatment of 
the eminent dominion was thus written by a young Harvard law student 
named James Bradley Thayer in 1856. When Thayer finished law school in 
 
78 See infra Section II.B (describing the use of “eminent domain” to mean sovereign’s title in 
mid-nineteenth-century public land debates). 
79 GROTIUS, supra note 67, at 1554 (accepting that in “[c]ase[s] of extreme Necessity,” a part of a state 
may sever itself “because it is probable that Power was reserved, when civil Societies were instituted”). 
80 Id. at 569. 
81 VATTEL, supra note 68, at 179-80. 
82 Id. at 180. 
83 See generally WILLIAM WOODWARD, A CATALOGUE OF THE LAW LIBRARY OF HARVARD 
UNIVERSITY IN CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS (Cambridge, Folsom, Wells & Thurston 1841). 
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1856, a prominent Boston lawyer heralded his entry to the bar by publishing 
his Harvard prize essay called “The Right of Eminent Domain.”84 
Remarkably, Thayer devoted much of his first scholarly publication to 
explaining what the eminent domain is not. The eminent domain is not, he 
cautioned, “the right of sovereign power in general”; nor is it the literal 
“domain” of public land; nor is it the power of taxation; nor is it the regulation 
of property; nor is it the law of necessity in the sense contemplated by the law 
of private property.85 Indeed, for Thayer, the eminent dominion was not an 
abstract “right of property” at all: “although Grotius originated the name, yet 
he did not originate that for which the name stands . . . .”86 Eminent domain 
simply stands for the “taking [of] private property for public purposes.”87 
Thayer would argue for more than fifty years that the title-oriented idea 
of the sovereign’s eminent dominion was “petty.”88 But the equivalence 
between “takings” and “eminent domain” was not as crisply fixed as Thayer 
would have liked. As I shall now explain, the other meanings of the eminent 
dominion instead became a central situs of constitutional conflict in the mid-
nineteenth through mid-twentieth century. 
II. FEDERALISM AND THE SOVEREIGN’S EMINENT DOMINION 
Having explained the ideological origins of the eminent dominion, and 
having described the warring ideas of dual-sovereign federalism, popular-
sovereign federalism, and the conservation-of-powers thesis, I now turn to 
the constitutional battles over whether any American government could 
exercise a broad “eminent dominion” by treaty. As I have noted and will 
explain in the last Part of this Article, this history was excised from canonical 
histories of the treaty power in the early-twentieth century, in order to 
practice cleanly an imperial government. 
 
84 James Bradley Thayer, Note, The Right of Eminent Domain, 19 MONTHLY L. REP. 241 (1856). 
85 Id. at 244-46. 
86 Id. at 246. 
87 Id. at 247. John Lewis advanced the same argument decades later. See 1 JOHN LEWIS, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (Chicago, Callaghan & 
Co. 1888) (“All other exercises of power over private property . . . may properly be referred . . . to 
some other of the sovereign powers of the State. Therefore eminent domain is properly limited in 
its application to the appropriation by a sovereign State of private property to particular uses, as the 
public welfare demands.”); see also William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings 
Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 799 (1995) (highlighting Lewis’s declaration 
that the Takings Clause applied not only to the deprivation of physical things, but also to the 
deprivation of “certain rights in and appurtenant to those things”). 
88 James Bradley Thayer, Book Review, 8 HARV. L. REV. 237 (1894); see also 1 PHILIP 
NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 24 nn.47-51 (2d ed. 1917) (surveying the nineteenth-
century confusion); cf. Letter from Carman Randolph to James Bradley Thayer (July 1, 1894) (on 
file with Harvard Law School Special Collections) (“[Y]ou know better than most . . . how many 
mistakes have been made in defining [the eminent domain].”). 
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From 1825 to 1850, the American political elite debated two related 
constitutional puzzles: the first-order question of whether any government 
possesses the power to acquire and cede territory; and the second-order 
question of whether the federal government or the states hold original title 
to land so acquired. 
These disputes demanded answers to mixed questions of private and 
public law, and so they drew out careful reasoning from the partisans who 
debated their answers. The stakes were also high: “All together this public 
domain represented a vast reservoir of potential national wealth and provided 
a crucial outlet for the growth of the American population.”89 And, because 
these disputes are largely settled, they reveal something about the history of 
our constitutional culture while being less prone to revelatory vindications of 
modern political intuitions. 
A small vignette illustrates the extent to which these issues were conjoined 
in constitutional politics: In March 1837, former Chancellor James Kent 
invited Daniel Webster to New York City to give a public address. Webster 
arrived in New York on March 15, 1837, where over two-and-a-half hours he 
discussed hallmark issues of nineteenth-century politics: slavery, the national 
bank, paper money, internal improvements, and the presidency.90 But much of 
his speech was dedicated to the annexation and cession of foreign land, and 
the government’s title to such lands once acquired.91 On these last questions, 
Webster ably defended the views of his party. He argued that the annexation 
of Texas by treaty would be unconstitutional.92 He also acknowledged the 
existence of “[t]he idea, that when a new State is created, the public lands lying 
within her . . . become [her] property . . . in consequence of her sovereignty” 
but rejected it as “too preposterous for serious refutation.”93 
Yet Webster’s sweeping rejection of annexation and the new states’ title 
suggests that the positions he was assailing were not so preposterous as to 
pass without mention. Indeed, Webster’s speech assumed a partisan posture 
on central constitutional battles that left an enduring imprint on our foreign-
affairs federalism. Fifty years later, the power to annex was finally accepted 
as a fait accompli; the title to territory acquired by such acquisition was firmly 
vested in the federal government (though the U.S. Reports still bear the scars 
of litigation connected to that settlement); and the power to cede territory 
was denied to the federal government.94 
 
89 Jerry Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists, 116 YALE L. J. 1636, 1696 (2007). 
90 Senator Daniel Webster, Speech at Niblo’s Saloon in New York: We Have One Country—
One Constitution—One Destiny 1-2 (Mar. 15, 1837). 
91 Id. at 11-12. 
92 Id. at 11. 
93 Id. at 7. 
94 See infra Section II.A. 
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By accounting for Webster’s victories and losses, we can get some purchase 
on the peculiar constitutional history that the mid-nineteenth century 
furnished to the twentieth. That is to say, we can understand what Justice 
Holmes would come to obliquely criticize as an “invisible radiation from the 
general terms of the Tenth Amendment” in Missouri v. Holland,95 and what 
Justices Scalia and Thomas would later critique as “[a]n unreasoned and 
citation-less sentence” in the Court’s seminal discussion of the limits of the 
American government’s treaty power.96 As I shall argue in the concluding Part 
of this Article, reviving these mid-nineteenth-century contests also draws into 
view the early-twentieth-century effort to shore up an imperial power to 
acquire territory and to maintain it as the dominion of the federal sovereign. 
A. Acquisitions and Cessions 
The legal history of the powers of acquisition and cession is well settled. 
First, despite his initial scruples about whether a federal acquisition power 
was consistent with “strict construction,” Thomas Jefferson accomplished the 
Louisiana Purchase.97 Second, the Marshall Court took up the acquisition 
power twenty-five years later in American Insurance v. Canter.98 Marshall 
agreed with counsel’s argument in that case that although the “express terms” 
of the Constitution do not contemplate acquisition, the power could be 
derived from the “universal principles of general law; from the powers of 
making peace, and war, and of making treaties, etc.”99 Marshall thus 
sanctioned Jefferson’s purchase by holding that the power to acquire territory 
is a “consequen[ce]” of the federal government’s treaty or war-making 
powers.100 Marshall, it is thought, “entirely put to rest” the “power to acquire 
territory by treaty.”101 Finally, the acquisition of Texas enlarged the power by 
allowing annexation by mere joint resolution. 
The above-recited history evinces a fair measure of victor’s justice, both 
domestic and imperial. Viewing the history of acquisition in this way suffers 
from three critical flaws. 
The first flaw is that Jefferson’s misgivings were unknown for the first few 
decades of the nineteenth century and were not public when Marshall decided 
Canter. Jefferson’s skepticism entered the vernacular of popular constitutional 
 
95 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920). 
96 Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 873 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
97 See, e.g., EVERETT SOMERVILLE BROWN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE 
LOUISIANA PURCHASE, 1803–1812, at 28 (1920); 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 160 n.1 (Boston, Little & Brown 1851). 
98 See Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 524 (1828). 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 542. 
101 Golove, supra note 6, at 1190 n.357. 
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argument thirty years later. At that point, Jefferson’s reservations became a 
cudgel of hypocrisy with which people like Joseph Story could beat strict 
constructionists.102 Because Jefferson’s constitutional scruples entered the 
debate so late, in order to understand the annexation problem and its 
resolution, one must look to the political era in which the issue was genuinely 
debated—that is, the decades after Canter was decided. 
The second problem with the prevailing history of the acquisition power 
is that Marshall’s quick pronouncement in Canter that there was a consequent 
power to acquire territory was easily distinguished in the decades that 
followed. As described in more detail below, as the acquisition of Texas moved 
to the fore of constitutional debate, influential opponents of the acquisition 
power dismissed Canter as dicta or distinguished Canter as inapplicable to 
anything but the territory of Louisiana.103 In short, Canter settles the 
acquisition question only to the eyes of the modern lawyer who is committed 
to the historical fidelity of the U.S. Reports.104 
But the most important flaw in the orthodox history of territorial 
acquisition is that it expunges the most sophisticated fights over the treaty 
power’s reach from the American constitutional narrative. The annexation 
question, which turned on the propriety of drawing the eminent dominion 
into American public law, remained open to dispute to the end of the 
nineteenth century. Indeed, the question remained so unsettled as to permit a 
national partisan fight over acquiring Texas, and it remained an open question 
in the twentieth century with respect to the propriety of imperial government. 
1. Acquiring Louisiana and Texas 
The orthodox history of the acquisition power was written by Everett 
Brown, whose 1920 Ph.D. dissertation entitled “The Constitutional History 
of the Louisiana Purchase” collected Jefferson’s skeptical thoughts about 
acquisition in a chapter describing the “contemporary opinion” of the 
“constitutional right to acquire territory.”105 Today, Brown’s history 
 
102 See, e.g., STORY, supra note 97, at 160 n.1 (“President Jefferson himself . . . was of the 
opinion that the measure was unconstitutional	.	.	.	. What a latitude of interpretation is this! The 
constitution may be overleaped, and a broad construction adopted for favorite measures . . . !”). 
103 See, e.g., COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., REPORT ON THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS TO 
THE UNITED STATES, S. 50, at 19 (1838) (“[T]he power exercised in the case of Louisiana, and that 
which is proposed to be exercised in the admission of Texas . . . are distinct in their character, and 
depend upon entirely different principles.”). 
104 See Mark A. Graber, Settling the West: The Annexation of Texas, the Louisiana Purchase, and 
Bush v. Gore, in SANFORD LEVINSON ET AL., THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND AMERICAN 
EXPANSION, 1803–1898, at 84 (2005) (“Efforts to analogize the process by which the West was 
settled to the processes by which the constitutional questions that occupy much contemporary 
scholarship are settled risks embroiling American constitutionalism in a vicious circle.”). 
105 BROWN, supra note 97, at 14-35. 
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underwrites nearly all the major general and specialist histories of the 
constitutionality of acquisition.106 
As Brown’s history argued, Jefferson had concluded that the Constitution 
would have to be amended to authorize the acquisition of Louisiana. Some in 
Jefferson’s cabinet tried to square an acquisition power with the Constitution’s 
text; others resisted.107 Ultimately, Brown wrote, Jefferson swallowed his doubts: 
Although Jefferson was convinced that “[t]he Executive . . . ha[s] done an act 
beyond the Constitution,” it would be up to later generations to judge his 
choice.108 When that generation comes of age, an “act of indemnity will confirm 
and not weaken the Constitution, by more strongly marking out its lines.”109 
Brown’s notion was that Jefferson was, with a heavy heart, transgressing 
the Constitution for the good of the country—he “risk[ed him]self for you.”110 
That conceit dovetailed with widespread contemporary public approval of the 
Louisiana Purchase. A young Joseph Story, for example, recommended that 
Massachusetts vote to approve the purchase.111 An even younger Daniel 
Webster praised the purchase in a senior declamation at Dartmouth.112 
Crucially, Jefferson’s misgivings were not known outside his circle of 
confidants and played no role in the early settlement of the acquisition 
question. A diplomatic history published in the same year as Jefferson’s death, 
for example, makes no mention of Jefferson’s critique, describing instead an 
unremarkable incorporation of Louisiana following the “surrender of the 
province . . . in the usual form.”113 
To be sure, the conclusion that Jefferson’s acquisition accomplished an “act 
beyond the Constitution”114 did eventually enter popular constitutional 
politics, but only after Canter was decided. Canter brought the uncertain 
constitutional basis for acquisition into focus to those who resisted further 
 
106 See, e.g., PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 155 
n.92 (7th ed. 2018) (referring to Brown’s treatment of the history of the Louisiana Purchase); 
Cleveland, Powers Inherent, supra note 58, at 167-71 (repeatedly citing Brown’s history in a discussion 
of the history of the Louisiana Purchase). 
107 See BROWN, supra note 97, at 20, 31 (noting that “[Secretary of State] Madison answered that 
‘he did not know that it was universally agreed that it required an amendment’” and that Secretary of 
the Treasury Gallatin “could see no difference ‘between a power to acquire territory for the United 
States and the power to extend by treaty the territory of the United States’” (citation omitted)). 
108 Id. at 25 (citation omitted). 
109 Id. (citation omitted). 
110 Id. (citation omitted). 
111 See Letter from Jacob Crowninshield to Joseph Story (Feb. 13, 1804) (on file with University 
of Michigan Archives). 
112 See Daniel Webster, Would it be Advantageous to the United States to Extend Their Territories? 
(Dec. 25, 1800), in 11 PROC. MASS. HIST. SOC’Y 329-330 (1870) (“[W]e are under necessity of 
extending our territories by possessing ourselves of all the country adjacent those rivers, necessary 
for our commerce, or of giving up the idea of ever seeing Western America a flourishing country.”). 
113 THEODORE LYMAN, THE DIPLOMACY OF THE UNITED STATES 113 (Boston, Wells & Lily 1826). 
114 BROWN, supra note 97, at 25 (citation omitted). 
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acquisitions. By then, the principal resistors were two men who had once 
supported the acquisition of Louisiana—Joseph Story (since elevated to the 
Supreme Court) and Daniel Webster—and a prominent abolitionist named 
William Ellery Channing. These three participated in the creation of a widely 
circulated set of documents that resisted the acquisition of Texas on 
constitutional grounds. They nearly won. 
Channing’s contribution to the Texas debate started with a series of letters 
to his classmates.115 Channing intended to oppose publicly the annexation of 
Texas to staunch the spread of slavery.116 He asked a friend to help him canvass 
the constitutional objections, who in turn forwarded the request to Justice Joseph 
Story.117 Story replied from Washington by explaining that the relevant points 
of constitutional law were “much discussed in the debates on the Louisiana 
Treaty in 1803, which were collected in a volume (which I have) printed in 
1804.”118 Story admitted that he agreed with Marshall’s holding in Canter that 
the federal government could acquire territory, but added that is a “very 
different question from the point whether a foreign State, as such, is admissible 
into the Union.”119 On that question, Story could not “see any ground, upon 
which Texas, as an independent state, is admissible into the union.”120 
Story offered to send his own copy of the 1804 debates to aid Channing’s 
argument against Texas.121 This copy is preserved in Harvard Law School’s 
library,122 and is marked up by someone eager to contest the constitutionality 
of acquisition. Nearly all of the floor speeches opposing the acquisition of 
Louisiana are highlighted. For example, the argument by one congressman 
that the “power to incorporate new territory did not exist” is highlighted in 
the margin.123 The speaker argued that annexation would allow the Senate 
and the Executive to “add to the numbers of the union by treaty whenever 
they please” and “destroy[] the perfect union contemplated between the 
original parties, by interposing an alien . . . to share the powers of 
government with them.”124 
 
115 See Fulmer Mood & Granville Hicks, Letters to Dr. Channing on Slavery and the Annexation 
of Texas, 1837, in 5 NEW ENGL. Q. 587, 587 (1932) (describing the correspondence between 
classmates); Russell K. Osgood, Book Review, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 726, 730 (1986) (noting that 
Story and Channing were classmates). 
116 Mood & Hicks, supra note 115, at 587. 
117 Id. at 587-88 (describing Channing’s correspondence with Joseph Tuckerman and Joseph Story). 
118 Id. at 593 (footnote omitted). 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 594. 
122 See DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON THE BILL FOR CARRYING INTO 
EFFECT THE LOUISIANA TREATY (Philadelphia, Thomas & George Palmer 1804) (on file with 
Harvard Law School Library) (signed by Joseph Story). 
123 Id. at 62. 
124 Id. at 102-03. 
2020] The Imperial Treaty Power 959 
Channing used the material gleaned from Story’s volume to write an open 
letter opposing annexation. “The annexation of Texas,” he predicted, “will 
give rise to constitutional questions and conflicts, which cannot be 
adjusted.”125 Although the North agreed to annex Louisiana “very reluctantly, 
on account of [its] obvious utility,” Channing argued that the proposed 
annexation of Texas would unlawfully “admit an independent community, 
invested with sovereignty, into the confederation.”126 Channing then asked a 
series of rhetorical questions: “can the treaty-making power do this? Can [the 
treaty-making power] receive foreign nations, however vast, to the Union?”127 
And finally, “Does not the question carry its own answer?”128 
Many Northerners answered Channing’s questions. One history reports 
that 182,400 citizens petitioned the House to oppose the annexation of 
Texas.129 Chief among them was a brief of the Massachusetts legislature, 
which neatly elaborated the popular-sovereign theory that federalism 
prohibited any exercise of the treaty-making power that altered the 
composition of the popular sovereign. 
Massachusetts argued that no arm of the federal government has the 
“competency” to acquire Texas and contended that annexation “can only be 
accomplished by the exercise of the reserved sovereignty of the people.”130 
Indeed, the government could not accomplish annexation without adopting 
“another frame of government radically different, in objects, principles and 
powers from that which was framed for our own self-government, and 
deemed to be adequate to all the exigences of our own free Republic.”131 A 
power to annex cannot be “incidental to the general nature of our 
government,” Massachusetts argued, because “all and each have a right to say 
with whom they will or will not be connected.”132 And, if Louisiana was taken 
to be an analogous precedent, Massachusetts had a ready answer: “The 
posthumous publication of [Jefferson’s] writings [in 1829] has fully disclosed 
that Jefferson himself believed . . . that his own acts . . . were not authorized 
by the constitution, but that they implied the exercise of a power forbidden 
by its spirit . . . .”133 If even Jefferson had rejected the Louisiana Purchase, 
Massachusetts contended, then the purchase was no precedent at all. 
 
125 WILLIAM ELLERY CHANNING, THE COMPLETE WORKS OF W.E. CHANNING 639, 
(London, Routledge & Sons 1873). 
126 Id. at 639-40. 
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83 (Portland, Thurston & Co. 1886). 
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In Massachusetts’s view, the treaty power was not unlimited. To find its 
extent, one should “look for its nature and limits . . . to the law of nations, 
except so far as it may be restrained by other provisions of the constitution 
itself.”134 One cardinal limitation furnished by the law of nations, 
Massachusetts argued, is that the treaty-making power cannot affect things 
that “belong inalienably to the people, and . . . cannot be[] delegated by them 
to their governments.”135 Treaties could settle boundaries or exchange 
“dependencies” that are “the mere property of the Prince,” but treaties could 
not transfer the “principal empire”—the eminent dominion—of the state.136 
Massachusetts then canvassed the eminent-domain writings of Vattel, Samuel 
Puffendorf, and Grotius to shore up the argument that the “disposition 
of . . . sovereignty” cannot be “a subject of barter by governments.”137 (The 
emphasis in these passages is in the original: a people’s government cannot 
barter away the people’s sovereignty—their eminent dominion—to other 
sovereigns.) So, Texas could not give itself to us, and we could not receive it.138 
Crucially, Massachusetts argued, the union of a foreign sovereignty with 
our government can only be “effected by the summa jus, the highest rights of 
reserved sovereignty. It must be the act of the people themselves, and not of 
their rulers and servants.”139 
The Senate rejected the acquisition of Texas by treaty, spurring 
proponents of annexation to begin a new effort to acquire Texas by ordinary 
legislation. With a new sense of alarm, on January 26, 1845, Daniel Webster 
summoned two local lawyers to his Boston office.140 As he paced the room, 
Webster dictated one final argument to oppose the annexation of Texas.141 
The question, Webster argued, “touches the identity of the Republic” and 
presents a “plain violation of the Constitution.”142 Like Channing and the 
Massachusetts legislature, Webster argued that no member of Congress is 
“clothed with any such authority” to modify the union.143 Nor would the state 
legislatures have such power. Like the consent required to form the union, 
the “assent was given, not by the Legislature, but by a Convention of 
Delegates, chosen directly by the people . . . and with authority, therefore, to 
bind the people in a manner to which no other representative body was 
 
134 Id. at 21. 
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competent.”144 Annexation of foreign states would thus require higher-order 
lawmaking145 by the dormant popular sovereign—no representative 
government was competent to exercise the sovereign people’s eminent 
dominion whether by treaty or otherwise. So here was Massachusetts’s fully 
formed popular-sovereign federalism: even if annexation is part of some 
sovereigns’ treaty-making power, the American sovereign delegated that 
power to neither of its governments. Massachusetts thus elaborated a vision 
of American foreign-affairs federalism that required no theory of “state 
sovereignty” to limit the treaty power. 
Yet Massachusetts lost. Congress voted to annex Texas on March 1, 1845 and 
to admit Texas on December 29, 1845.146 The joint resolutions carried simple 
majorities in both houses.147 Although Massachusetts generated a plausible 
critique of annexation, politics overbore high ideals. The election of a President—
James K. Polk—who favored annexation148 would become, in the gloss of the 
imperial histories written at the turn of the next century, a constitutional moment 
that enlarged the treaty power by placing the issue on the ballot. 
The constitutional debate over the power to annex Texas is now consigned 
to a long footnote in the constitutional history of Texas.149 Yet the resolution 
of the Texas question represented the first, highly contingent effort to define 
a canonical view of the annexation power received from the eminent 
dominion. For the first time, the fact that Jefferson thought that acquisition 
was unconstitutional entered public debate. And partly as a consequence of 
that timing, Marshall’s view of the treaty-making power elaborated in Canter 
did not settle the question. In short, the annexation power could not be 
clothed in “our federalism” or resolved by invoking the founders’ meaning 
recovered from time out of mind. 
But politics did not vanquish Massachusetts’s argument for good. After all, 
there were two other eminent-dominion debates still to be resolved: the power 
to cede territory and the right of title over territory acquired from others. 
2. Maine’s Pride of Dominion 
Just as a treaty controversy sparked the constitutional upheaval over 
Texas, a treaty motivated the contest over the federal government’s power to 
cede territory. Today, as Justice Thomas recently demonstrated, it is possible 
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to draw from the Federalist Papers the contention that “[t]he President and 
Senate lacked the power ‘to dismember the empire.’”150 But, as the second 
generation of constitutional lawyers would discover, the generalities of the 
Federalist Papers gave way to the realities of international life. Maine’s 
northern boundary produced the constitutional contest. 
The northeast boundary of the United States was ostensibly fixed in 1783 
by the Treaty of Peace that ended the Revolutionary War.151 Accordingly, the 
territory which included Maine was to be a “free, sovereign and independent” 
state, whose boundary, in pertinent part, was to run along “Highlands which 
divide those rivers that empty themselves into the River St. Lawrence.”152 As 
was apparent to the drafters, the treaty’s incorporation of a boundary line 
running through “Highlands” was ambiguous.153 
The highland boundary became mired in decades of arbitration and the 
object of a hard-fought constitutional debate. By the end of the War of 1812, 
confusion over Maine’s highland boundary entered its fourth decade. A new 
treaty of peace referred the boundary dispute to arbitration.154 
While arbitration negotiations were unfolding, Maine—since made a state 
independent from Massachusetts—loudly resisted any arbitration of its 
border with Canada. Governor Enoch Lincoln used his inaugural address to 
call upon Maine to be “tenacious of its territorial possessions,” and sketched 
out a view of the eminent dominion that would develop into a rallying cry 
over the following decade.155 
Lincoln told his legislature that “we have no reason to believe that the 
right or disposition anywhere exists to cede our soil, . . . which would be an 
abuse in which neither the people nor the governments of the Union or the 
States would acquiesce.”156 He confidently predicted that “our inalienable 
 
150 Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 888 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing 3 DEBATES 
ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 514 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1876)). 
151 Definitive Treaty of Peace, Gr. Brit.-U.S., Sept. 3, 1783, 18 Stat. 266-69. 
152 Id. at 266-67. 
153 See 1 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 98 (Washington, Gov’t 
Printing Off. 1898) (providing that the highland line would be resolved “as soon as 
conveniently	.	.	.	after the war” (citing 5 FRANCIS WHARTON, THE REVOLUTIONARY 
DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 808 (Washington, Gov’t Printing Off. 
1889))); President Jefferson’s Third Annual Message to Congress (Oct. 17, 1803), reprinted in 1 
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 62 (1833) (noting that the Maine boundary was 
“too imperfectly described to be susceptible to execution”). 
154 Treaty of Ghent, Gr. Brit.-U.S., art. V, Dec. 24, 1814, 8 Stat. 218 (referring the “Highlands” 
boundary first to commissioners, but in the alternative to binding arbitration by a “friendly sovereign”). 
155 Israel Washburn, Jr., The North-Eastern Boundary, in 8 COLLECTIONS OF THE MAINE 
HISTORICAL SOCIETY 31 (Portland, Hoyt, Fogg & Donham 1881). 
156 Id. 
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sovereignty will be respected.”157 Lincoln then wrote to Secretary of State 
Henry Clay, holding himself out as “the only organ of communication of the 
people of Maine.”158 His letter introduced a remarkable contention, which 
remains underscored in pencil in the State Department archives: “[n]either 
the treaty making or executive power of the United States extends to the 
cession or exchange of the territory of any State, without its consent.”159 
Maine’s constitutional argument to the State Department was that “neither 
department of the Federal Government, nor all [federal departments], can be 
the . . . arbiter . . . of a boundary already established . . . because, if one 
department, or all, have this power, they may . . . indirectly cede our State.”160 
The following month, Lincoln wrote to President John Quincy Adams to 
inquire about a “rumor” he had heard that the United States was referring the 
boundary to arbitration.161 Although, he wrote, the “treaty making 
power . . . engage[s] to consider the decision of the Arbitrator 
conclusive . .	. there is another party, not to be an indifferent spectator to its own 
delaceration.”162 Secretary Clay replied and disclosed that the boundary would, 
indeed, be referred to an arbitrator.163 
Lincoln once again addressed Maine’s legislature to decry the forthcoming 
arbitration. He contended that the effort to arbitrate the boundary “is to 
pronounce the State unfit for self-government . . .	.	Even the privilege of 
being able to give [the territory] away is worth more than . . . the richest mine 
of gold.”164 Lincoln asked whether the treaty-making power could “exercise a 
function beyond the grasp of the delegated power over the whole” and, with 
the complicity of a foreign sovereign arbitrator, “do what it could not 
accomplish without; that is, consent to the alienation . . . of territo[r]y.”165 
Lincoln’s theory of the eminent dominion—of soil, territory, exclusive 
possession, and sovereignty—was entirely lifted from the law-of-nations 
canon. Lincoln thus asked the assembled legislature whether “the United 
States [has] any constitutional authority to cede any part of an independent 
 
157 Id. 
158 Letter from Enoch Lincoln, Governor of Me., to Henry Clay, U.S. Sec’y of State (Apr. 18, 
1827), in 326 U.S. CONGRESSIONAL SERIAL SET 150 (1838). 
159 Id. at 151. 
160 Id. at 153. 
161 Letter from Enoch Lincoln, Governor of Me., to John Quincy Adams, U.S. President (May 
29, 1827), in RESOLVES OF THE EIGHTH LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF MAINE 751 (Portland, 
Thomas Todd 1828) [hereinafter RESOLVES]. 
162 Id. at 752. 
163 Letter from Henry Clay, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Enoch Lincoln, Governor of Me. (Nov. 10, 
1827), in 6 PAPERS OF HENRY CLAY 1251 (Mary W. M. Hargreaves & James F. Hopkins eds., 1981). 
164 Enoch Lincoln, Governor of Me., Speech to Both Houses of the Legislature (Jan. 3, 1828), 
in RESOLVES, supra note 161, at 621. 
165 Id. Enoch Lincoln, Governor of Me., Message to the Joint Select Committee of the House 
and Senate of Maine (Jan. 5, 1828), in RESOLVES, supra note 161, at 661. 
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sovereignty composing one of its members.”166 Given the idea of territorial 
“dominion” expressed in the law of nations, Lincoln argued that “it cannot be 
supposed that [the states] ever intended to give to the general government 
any power by which they might be destroyed and consolidated . . . .”167 
Reflecting the complex idea of the eminent dominion that pervaded his era, 
Lincoln made title, jurisdiction, and sovereignty coextensive.168 Whether 
lands were cultivated or vacant, territory that was the dominion of the state 
could not be ceded.169 Nor could Maine cede the territory to another 
sovereign on its own.170 
Maine’s constitutional cri de coeur consumed Lincoln’s governorship. 
Lincoln’s successor, Governor Samuel Smith, continued to press the “justice 
of the[] claim” by “the people of the state” to the disputed territory.171 
When the rumor reached Maine that the King of the Netherlands had 
arbitrated the boundary, Smith wrote to the federal government to express his 
concern that the “boundaries, as designated by treaties, have been totally 
disregarded.”172 Maine saw in the treaty of peace “[a] power of dismembering 
States” that “might in its consequences break down and absorb all the State 
sovereignties.”173 Maine added that “[i]f the	. . .	United States can cede a portion 
of an independent State to a foreign government, she can, by the same principle, 
cede the whole . . .	she can by the same principle annex one State to another 
until the whole are consolidated, and become the sole sovereign	. . . .”174 
Maine’s resistance to the arbitrator’s award thus stumbled upon a difficult 
question: if all American governments are deprived of a treaty-making power 
of cession, can territory ever be alienated to purchase peace without amending 
the Constitution? The question would haunt Maine’s constitutional theory. 
Maine would argue only that the power of cession “cannot be exercised 
without the agreement and consent of the State, if it can be done[] without the 
agreement and consent of all the States in the manner provided for amending 
 
166 Id. at 694. 
167 Id. at 695. 
168 Id. at 699. 
169 See id. (noting that Massachusetts had presumed that British settlers would not attempt to 
settle on Massachusetts land and would immediately withdraw if they so did accidentally). 
170 See Letter from Enoch Lincoln, Governor of Me., to John Quincy Adams, U.S. President (May 
29, 1827), in RESOLVES, supra note 161, at 751 (explaining the Governor’s belief that Maine was “bound 
from deference” to notify the federal government that Britain had claimed a tract of the state’s land). 
171 Letter from Samuel E. Smith, Governor of Me., to Andrew Jackson, U.S. President (Mar. 
2, 1831) (on file with author). 
172 Id. 
173 Report of the Select Committee of the Maine House of Representatives (Feb. 28, 1831), in 
RESOLVES OF THE ELEVENTH LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF MAINE 242, 244 (Portland, Todd 
& Holden 1831). 
174 Id. 
2020] The Imperial Treaty Power 965 
or altering the Constitution.”175 Like Massachusetts’s argument against 
annexing Texas by treaty, Maine’s federalism would, if taken to its conclusion, 
have required some plebiscitary act by the dormant sovereign before its 
dominion could be ceded to another sovereign.176 
President Jackson referred Maine’s objections to the Secretary of State 
and appended a handwritten instruction to assess the merits of Maine’s 
arguments.177 He also referred the arbitrator’s award to the Senate, which in 
turn debated whether it had anything to do. On the one hand, as Webster 
argued, the Treaty of Ghent already committed the United States to 
arbitration, and the President was in need of no advice or consent to “take 
care” that the treaty was executed. On the other hand, the Treaty of Ghent 
might be an “imperfect” treaty, which might require additional advice and 
consent.178 The latter constitutional claim won out, and thirty-four of forty-
two Senators voted against “ratifying” the arbitrator’s award.179 
Following the Senate’s vote, Secretary of State Livingston wrote to his 
British counterpart to advance a number of arguments impugning the arbitral 
award. He explained that Maine now “disputes the right of the United States 
to diminish the extent of her territory,”180 and proposed yet another round of 
negotiations to clarify the line provided by the Treaty of 1783. After 
expressing some exasperation, the British agent asked whether “any 
arrangement for avoiding the constitutional difficulty . . . has yet been 
concluded between the United States and the State of Maine.”181 
There had been a remarkable arrangement. On February 14, 1832, Jackson 
instructed Secretary of State Livingston to speak privately with a Mainer 
involved in the boundary dispute.182 Livingston conveyed a general 
agreement with Maine’s argument: if the arbitrator’s award deviated from the 
Treaty of 1783, “a question would arise as to the power of the U.S. to establish 
 
175 Id. (emphasis added). 
176 Id. 
177 See, e.g., Note from Andrew Jackson, U.S. President (June 23, 1831) (on file with National 
Archives, NARA RG PI-170, Entry 89, No. 61) (referring the report to the “Sec. of State for his reflection 
and deliberation and a synopsis of the reply . . . to be given, when the proper time arrives . . . .”). 
178 See FRANCIS M. CARROLL, A GOOD AND WISE MEASURE: THE SEARCH FOR THE 
CANADIAN-AMERICAN BOUNDARY 190-91 (2001). 
179 Proceeding of the Senate on the Subject of the North Eastern Boundary, NILES WKLY. 
REG., Aug. 25, 1832, at 464. 
180 Report on the Northeastern Boundary at 2 (unpublished and undated manuscript) (on file 
with National Archives, NARA RG 76, PI-170). 
181 Id. at 4. 
182 See Memorandum from Mr. Livingston & Mr. Preble (Feb. 15, 1832) (on file with National 
Archives, NARA RG 76, Records of Boundary and Claims Commissions and Arbitrations) 
(“Pursuant to instructions given to me by the President yesterday I requested W. Preble to meet me 
at the Department . . . .”). 
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any such new boundary at the expense of one or more of the States.”183 
Whatever the answer to the constitutional question, Livingston admitted that 
“the President was extremely desireous of	. . .	an arrangement” to resolve the 
impasse.184 Livingston proposed an “informal negotiation with some person 
duly authorized to act for the State of Maine.”185 This artifice was necessary, 
Livingston said, because “an agreement between the Executive of the U.S. 
and an individual state could neither have the form nor the effect of a treaty 
[since] the President had no power to cede the lands of the U.S.”186 In reply, 
Maine’s Governor appointed, “with the advice and consent of Council,” three 
“Commissioners” empowered to “arrive at some . . . arrangement between 
the Government of [Maine] and of the United States . . . .”187 Andrew 
Jackson, in turn, instructed his Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Navy, to all 
meet with Maine’s commissioners in Washington. 
The six agents of the state and federal governments met throughout May 
and June of 1832, and concluded an “agreement”: if new negotiations with 
Britain “should be impracticable,” Maine would consent to a “mutually 
convenient” boundary.188 The federal government’s compensation to Maine was 
rich: Maine would receive the value of 1,000,000 acres of territory in present-
day Michigan.189 The agreement between Maine’s three commissioners and the 
Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Navy, was signed and sealed and remains in 
the State Department’s archives. 
The legal effect of this agreement was never tested. The following spring, 
Maine rescinded the authority it had given to the commissioners and with it 
scrapped the Jackson Administration’s ad hoc solution to the federalism 
puzzle posed by cession of land.190 The agreement remained secret for six 
years, until Massachusetts (which retained some title over the disputed 
territory) publicly decried a “treaty” between Maine and the federal 
government. This “treaty,” Massachusetts argued, was evidence that “the 
Executive was satisfied that our claim . . . could not be yielded to Great 






187 Letter from Samuel Smith, Governor of Me., to Andrew Jackson, U.S. President (May 10, 
1832) (on file with National Archives, NARA RG 76, PI-170, Entry 89, No. 77). 
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2020] The Imperial Treaty Power 967 
even if there were an agreement between the state of Maine and the federal 
government authorizing the cession of some land, “[i]t is	. . .	by no means 
certain how far such consent [by the state] would enable the Treaty authority 
to exert its powers.”192 In Maine’s renewed attack on the arbitral award, it 
pressed the theory that no treaty-making power allowed governments to trade 
away their subjects. Even a treaty attracting the consent of the Senate, 
President, and the “constitutional organs” of Maine might still be deficient 
because “[c]itizens might be made the subjects of a treaty transfer, 
and . . . allegiance and protection being reciprocally binding, the right to 
transfer a citizen to a foreign government—to sell him . . . might . . . be[] 
inconsistent with the spirit of our free institutions.”193 
This most difficult entailment of Maine’s constitutional theory—that 
neither government could cede the people to other sovereigns, even if the two 
governments worked together—would never be answered in this period. 
Once the State Department understood that Maine’s vision of federalism 
could be useful, it invoked Maine’s objection to reject the arbitrator’s award. 
Maine thus gave the federal government a winning negotiating tactic: if 
Britain would agree to settle, there would be no constitutional crisis because 
there would be no unlawful cession; if Britain resisted, then Maine stood 
ready to deprive the general government of the power to negotiate.194 
While every federal administration before had been careful to avoid 
engaging with the merits of Maine’s constitutional claim (and, indeed, had 
grumbled about Maine’s entry into international diplomacy), by 1838 caution 
gave way to embrace. Secretary of State John Forsyth wrote to Maine to 
affirm that “every successive Administration of the Federal Government in 
respect to its powers” has accepted that “the General Government is not 
competent . . . unless, perhaps, on grounds of imperious public necessity [to 
agree to] . . . a cession of territory . . .	or the exchange thereof for other 
territory . . . without the consent of the State.”195 
 
192 STATE OF MAINE, REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE MAINE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, at 2-3 (1837) (emphasis omitted) (on file with National Archives, NARA RG 
76, PI-170, Entry 131). 
193 Id. at 3. 
194 See Report on the Northeastern Boundary, supra note 180, at 18 (“[T]he only alternative 
being . . . to decide a conventional line of boundary . . . and the [U]nited [S]tates, not having the 
power to adopt the former without the assent of Maine . . . [we will] make another effort to discover 
the line of the treaty.”); see also Letter from John Forsyth to Sir Charles Vaughan (Apr. 28, 1835), 
reprinted in S. Doc. No. 24-414, at 54 (1836) (“[T]he President does not possess the power to establish 
a conventional boundary, without the assent of the State of Maine . . . .”). 
195 Letter from John Forsyth, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Edward Kent, Governor of Me. (Mar. 1, 
1838), in 3 JAMES D. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE 
PRESIDENTS, 1789–1908, at 442, 442 (1909) [hereinafter MESSAGES AND PAPERS]. 
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Forsyth also told his British counterpart that his government “has no 
power to agree” to a new boundary, since “a division of the disputed 
territory . . . would be considered by Maine as tantamount to a 
cession . . . and . . . the Federal Government has no power to agree to such 
an arrangement without the consent of the State concerned.”196 Maine’s 
constitutional politics succeeded, and its entrepreneurial constitutional 
argument was embraced by the federal government. The treaty power had 
found its first durable limit. 
Throughout 1840–1842, Webster undertook a public relations campaign in 
Maine to support an international resolution of the boundary crisis.197 Most 
fatefully, the federal government invited both Maine and Massachusetts to 
send commissioners to Washington to settle the boundary in concert with 
Great Britain. The Governor of Maine, still grasping at the proper mode of 
speaking for “the people,” recalled both houses of the legislature. The 
legislature in turn elected four commissioners. The Governor of 
Massachusetts had no quibbles about constitutional form and appointed, sua 
sponte, three commissioners.198 All were given commissions investing them 
with the full power of the states’ governments. 
Thus a large retinue of commissioners, foreign and domestic, arrived in 
Washington to finally settle the boundary. By July of 1842, Webster wrote to 
the state commissioners with the last, best offer. Great Britain and the United 
States would settle a boundary line, would exchange “equivalent” territory 
where that new line prejudiced something valuable, and would purchase the 
two states’ constitutional forbearance. Webster promised “that if the 
commissioners of the two states assent	. . .	the United States will undertake to 
pay to these states the sum of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars . . . .”199 
Massachusetts replied first. Massachusetts conceded that “[w]hether the 
national boundary . . . be suitable or unsuitable . . . are questions not for 
Massachusetts, but for the general government, upon its responsibility to the 
 
196 See Letter from Henry S. Fox to John Forsyth, U.S. Sec’y of State (Jan. 10, 1838), in 
MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 195, at 433, 433 (1909); see also Report on the Northeastern 
Boundary, supra note 180, at 28 (“The Federal government cannot alienate any portion of the 
territory of a State, and there is little prospect that the State of Maine . . . would agree to the 
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British negotiators explained, the whole conceit of the original arbitration was that the title was not 
yet quieted for either party: “[T]he title to the disputed territory is left imperfect by the 
treaty. . . . [T]he territory between the highlands claimed by the United States is not the absolute 
property of either party, and is not such territory as the United States can be constitutionally 
prevented from relinquishing.” Report on the Northeastern Boundary, supra note 179, at 8. 
197 See CARROLL, supra note 178, at 243-63. 
198 See id. at 260-61. 
199 Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Me. Comm’rs (July 15, 1842), in THE 
DIPLOMATIC AND OFFICIAL PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER WHILE SECRETARY OF STATE 41, 43 
(New York, Harper & Bros. 1848) [hereinafter PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER]. 
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whole country, to decide.”200 It promised to “relinquish[] to the United States 
[Massachusetts’] interest in the lands which will be excluded from the 
dominion of the United States”—provided that the General Government 
increased its offer by twenty percent.201 
Maine then agreed, begrudgingly. While disavowing any “mercenary” or 
“extortion[ate]” intentions, it once again argued that it was bound to resist 
any “curtailment or dismemberment” of its dominion.202 The last paragraphs 
of Maine’s response pivoted, however, to concede that “the executive of the 
United States, representing the sovereignty of the Union [now] assents” to 
the treaty for the “general good.”203 Even though a new treaty would “lead to 
a surrender of a portion of the birth-right of the people,” Maine’s 
commissioners agreed to exercise the “power vested in them by	. . .	the 
Legislature of Maine” to “assent” to a new treaty.204 
The Senate quickly ratified the treaty. The final boundary hewed closely 
to the boundary line provided by the arbitration award so loathed by 
Maine.205 Maine and Massachusetts each received $150,000 from the general 
government.206 The equivalence in their disbursements means that the 
liquidated value of Maine and Massachusetts’s constitutional objections was 
about the same, notwithstanding the heightened value Maine claimed for its 
sovereignty. The equivalence also suggests something about the value of 
something Maine had called more valuable than the richest mine of gold: the 
marginal value of Maine’s “jurisdiction and government”207 over the land was 
zero, since it received no more than Massachusetts (which, having 
relinquished sovereignty over Maine, made no such claims to an eminent 
dominion over the land). 
 
200 Letter from Comm’rs of Mass., to Daniel Webster, U.S. Sec’y of State (July 20, 1842), in 
PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER, supra note 199, at 49. 
201 Id. at 49. 
202 Letter from Comm’rs of Me., to Daniel Webster, U.S. Sec’y of State (July 22, 1842), in 
PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER, supra note 199, at 55. 
203 Id. at 56. 
204 Id. 
205 Compare J.L. Herbert, Map Showing British and American Territories with Lands in 
Dispute on the Maine, Quebec and New Brunswick Borders (1831) (facsimile on file with Yale 
University Library Map Collection), with Topographical Map of Maine Boundary, USGS 
TOPOVIEW, https://ngmdb.usgs.gov/topoview/viewer/#9/47.1117/-68.9231 [https://perma.cc/AW78-
RA8M] (last visited Mar. 21, 2020) (showing Maine boundary). 
206 See Webster-Ashburton Treaty, Gr. Brit.-U.S., art. V, Aug. 9, 1842, 8 Stat. 572. (“[T]he 
Government of the United States agreeing, with the States of Maine and Massachusetts, to pay 
them the further sum of three hundred thousand dollars, in equal moieties	.	.	.	.”). 
207 As Webster recorded, while Maine and Massachusetts each had “an interest in the soil,” 
Maine claimed an interest “in the jurisdiction and government.” Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. 
Sec’y of State, to John Fairfield, Governor of Me. (Apr. 11, 1842), in PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER, 
supra note 199, at 37. 
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Despite the central role of Maine’s constitutional politics, the preambular 
declarations of the final Webster-Ashburton treaty obscure the constitutional 
contest: this was an ordinary treaty, arising solely between the United States 
and Her Majesty the Queen. But the treaty’s substance records the price of 
Maine’s constitutional acquiescence. Article V provided that the United 
States would pay Maine and Massachusetts “three hundred thousand 
dollars . . . on account of their assent to the line of boundary described in 
th[e] treaty	. . . .”208 Great Britain’s representative insisted on publishing a 
record that “my Government incurs no responsibility for these engagements,” 
and protested that he was completely uninformed of the “nature and object” 
of the payments to Maine and Massachusetts.209 Webster wrote the same day 
to acknowledge that England would not incur “any responsibility” under 
Article V.210 This correspondence was attached to the treaty, though it does 
not appear in the final instrument of ratification.211 
The treaty establishing Maine’s final boundary looks to modern eyes like 
an ordinary boundary settlement between coequal international sovereigns, 
with little to signal the fifty years of constitutional controversy that preceded 
its ratification. Maine’s two decades of constitutional politics nevertheless left 
an imprint on the mid- to late-nineteenth-century vocabulary of foreign-
affairs federalism: no American government holds the eminent dominion 
necessary to cede territory to other sovereigns. 
Maine’s victory was eventually memorialized by the Supreme Court, but 
not in a treaty-power dispute. In Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, the Court 
drew upon the history of Maine not to limit the federal treaty-making power, 
but rather to limit the states’ power to cede territory without the federal 
government’s consent.212 
In Fort Leavenworth, a railroad company attempted to recover taxes it had 
paid to the state through which its railway ran, on the theory (among others) 
that the state had ceded its jurisdiction to tax the railroad to the federal 
government.213 In rejecting the railroad’s argument, the Court included two 
important dicta that illustrate the importance of Maine’s resistance to modern 
foreign-affairs federalism. 
 
208 Webster-Ashburton Treaty, supra note 206, art. V. 
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The first dictum of Fort Leavenworth was that the Maine boundary dispute 
had established that “whether represented by her Legislature, or through a 
convention specially called for that purpose,” no state may “cede her political 
jurisdiction and legislative authority over any part of her territory to a foreign 
country[] without the concurrence of the general government.”214 The Court 
thus elided the problem of representation posed by a treaty of cession by 
concluding that the state and the federal government must agree to do it. The 
Court further elided the problem of representing the popular sovereign’s 
interest in such a cession by remarking that a legislature or “a convention 
specially called” could authorize a cession.215 In the cases of Maine and 
Massachusetts, the Court noted, “[i]t was not deemed necessary to call a 
convention of the people” to empower the states’ commissioners to act.216 The 
Court explained that while the federal and state governments are different, 
they are closer kin than foreign sovereigns: “the State and general 
government[] may deal with each other in any way they may deem best to 
carry out the purposes of the Constitution.”217 On the facts presented, the 
Court had no need to decide the question of cession.218 
The Court’s second important dictum in Fort Leavenworth was its 
explanation that the general government “possess[es] the right of eminent 
domain within the States, using those terms, not as expressing the ultimate 
dominion or title to property, but as indicating the right to take private 
property for public uses. . . .”219 The Court’s dwelling on the definition of 
“eminent domain”—that is, that “eminent domain” does not signify “ultimate 
dominion or title to property”—marked the growth of American public law 
to reject the law-of-nations idea of the “domin. eminens.”220 The story of that 
evolution, and the constitutional battles that occasioned it, are the subject of 
the next Section. 
B. The Sovereign’s Title 
The exercise of the treaty-making power to barter territory created a 
second-order constitutional difficulty related to acquisition: which sovereign 
held original title to—or “eminent dominion” over—the unappropriated land 
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within new territory acquired by the federal government?221 While the issue 
was being resolved, some unusual arguments migrated from the frivolous to 
the mainstream. Meanwhile, the domestication of the law-of-nations idea of 
the eminent dominion reached its apex in American political argument. 
To abbreviate a familiar history, in the first decades of the republic, the 
original thirteen states ceded vast portions of their Westward territory to the 
federal government. Congress then considered various proposals to structure 
the admission process for new states composed of that land in order to “secure 
to the [federal government] the proceeds of the sales of the Western 
lands,	. . . to discharge the public debt, for which [the lands] are solemnly 
pledged.”222 Thus, “to secure to the Union their right to the soil,” the 
compacts of admission would forbid the new states from interfering with the 
federal government’s sale or regulation of its lands; taxing the federal lands 
awaiting sale; or disproportionately taxing non-resident purchasers.223 In 
exchange, Congress would grant the states one section in each surveyed 
township for schools, and a fraction of the proceeds of all land sales to aid in 
the construction of public roads.224 In Ohio, for example, Congress limited 
the amount given to the state to five percent of the net proceeds of federal 
land sales.225 The states were generally given one-twentieth of the public 
lands within their limits to finance their internal improvements.226 Federal 
title to the rest was protected in triplicate: treaties of cession; compacts; and 
conditions included in the statutes enabling the territories to enter the 
 
221 I bracket an inquiry into the title of indigenous people to this land. I do so for the sake of 
airing what these partisans took to be a discrete public law inquiry, but I do not mean to imply that 
indigenous peoples’ claim to original sovereign title was either spurious or settled. 
222 Letter from Albert Gallatin to William B. Giles, Chairman of the Comm. for Admitting 
the North-Western Territory into the Union (Feb. 13, 1802), in 1 THE WRITINGS OF ALBERT 
GALLATIN 76, 76 (Henry Adams ed., London, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1879). 
223 Id. at 77 (“States shall never interfere with the primary disposal of the soil by Congress; nor 
with any regulations which Congress may find necessary . . . [and] no tax shall be imposed on the 
property of the United States [nor] shall non-resident proprietors be taxed higher than residents.”). 
224 Id. at 78. 
225 See Ohio Enabling Act of 1802, Pub. L. No. 7-40, 2 Stat. 173, 175 § 7 (1802) (“[O]ne 
twentieth part of the nett proceeds of the lands lying within the said state sold by Congress . . . shall 
be applied to the laying out and making public roads . . . .”). 
226 Id.; HANNIS TAYLOR, THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 
256 (1911). 
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union.227 Only Texas retained title to its public lands after its above-described 
unorthodox admission to the union.228 
Although it accounts for a vanishingly small portion of the modern federal 
fisc, the federal government’s income from land was the only substantial 
source of revenue apart from customs duties and the tariff.229 The new states 
were left to view the federal public lands with jealousy. In 1845, a critical year 
in the story that follows, the state of Illinois collected $305,309.03 from all 
sources between 1845 and 1846, of which only $184.37 came from the sale of 
public land.230 In the same period, Alabama collected $274,246.79 from all 
sources.231 Yet the federal government realized $609,366.14 from the sale of 
public lands in Illinois and $97,369.81 from the sale of public lands in 
Alabama.232 In the delicate words of a House Select Committee, “[t]he new 
States	. . .	occupy a peculiar position with regard to their soil, having it owned 
by another government than their own.”233 
Illinois and Alabama especially loathed their “peculiar” eminent 
dominion. They channeled their loathing into constitutional litigation. 
Illinois was the innovator. In 1828, Governor Ninian Edwards addressed his 
legislature and invoked the dominium eminens to decry his state’s “one-
twentieth share” of its “sovereignty.”234 Edwards argued that “instead of that 
 
227 See, e.g., Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. 4 (codified at 1 U.S.C. LV-LVII (2018)) 
(establishing a congressionally-appointed secretary and setting aside 500 acres as the secretary’s 
preserve); Ohio Enabling Act of 1802, supra note 225, § 7 (granting Section 16 to each township and 
remitting 5 percent of federal land sale revenue to the states); Resolutions for the Government of 
the Western Territory, passed Apr. 23, 1784 (repealed 1787), in PUBLIC LAND COMMISSION, THE 
PUBLIC DOMAIN, ITS HISTORY, WITH STATISTICS 148, 148-49 (Washington, Gov’t Printing Off. 
1880) (discussing the division of land ceded by the states to the federal government and conditions 
imposed by Congress on those wishing to form new states in the ceded territory); Treaty of Paris of 
1783, Gr. Brit.-U.S., art. 1, Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80, 81 (relinquishing all territorial claims held by the 
British Crown to the United States). 
228 See ALDON SOCRATES LANG, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC LANDS IN TEXAS 
23 (1932) (noting that Texas is “the only public land state that has had complete control over both 
the public lands within its boundaries and the proceeds arising from . . . [the] sale of the lands”). 
229 See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, AN ACCOUNT OF THE RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES 
OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1776, at XIV (1886) (noting 
$309,710,959.92 in receipts from the sale of public lands in 1886). Nearly all the remainder came 
from the tariff. See id. at VIII (noting $184,902,215.20 in receipts from customs). 
230 See JOHN A. FAIRLIE, A REPORT ON THE TAXATION AND REVENUE SYSTEM OF 
ILLINOIS 243 (1910). 
231 See AMERICAN ALMANAC AND REPOSITORY OF USEFUL KNOWLEDGE FOR THE YEAR 
1847, at 267 (Boston, James Munroe & Co. 1846). 
232 REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE, H.R. Doc. No. 29-
9, at 15 (1846). 
233 SWAMP LANDS IN WISCONSIN AND ARKANSAS, H.R. Rep. No. 30-130, at 11 (1849). 
234 See Ninian W. Edwards, HISTORY OF ILLINOIS FROM 1778 TO 1833: LIFE AND TIMES OF 
NINIAN EDWARDS 113, 119 (Springfield, State J. Co. 1870) (“The right which belongs to the society, 
or to the sovereign, of disposing, in case of necessity, and for the public safety, of all the wealth 
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equality with our sister States,	.	.	.	we [are] reduced to the twentieth part of 
a State, with little detached spots of sovereignty, to be ascertained only by 
going to the Land Offices, and hunting for the quarter and half quarter 
sections of lands	. . . .”235 Edwards argued that “domain and empire are 
inseparable,” and that whoever holds “territory	.	.	.	ha[s] the exclusive right 
to govern it	.	.	.	. Both rights must concur, or neither can exist.”236 Indeed, 
Edwards continued, “Sovereignty gives the empire, or right of commanding 
in all places of the country belonging to the nation.”237 In short, Edwards 
thought that the eminent dominion must defeat federal title: “[t]he 
sovereignty of a State includes the right to exercise supreme and exclusive 
control over all lands within it.”238 
For proof of his distinctive theory of the title to public lands, Edwards 
invited the Illinois legislature to “hear Vattel on the subject.”239 
Notwithstanding the statutes and treaties securing the federal title to the land, 
all such “bargains, agreements, compacts or treaties	.	.	.	are [] perfect nullities” 
because “the United States can neither possess nor exercise the powers of 
sovereignty over nineteen-twentieths of the territory within the limits of a 
sovereign and independent State	. . . .”240 Edwards asked his legislature to 
petition for a return of the public lands, and to pursue relief in the courts. 
Edwards’s political theory was thus a prototypical mixture of an appeal to 
dual-sovereign federalism and the idea of eminent dominion domesticated 
from the law of nations. Title to soil was simply part of the eminent dominion 
that all sovereigns—new states included—enjoy as a matter of public law: “If 
[the states] have not all these powers they have none, in virtue of the right of 
jurisdiction. The exercise of one is, therefore, a claim to all.”241 
Edwards’s speech laying claim to Illinois’s eminent dominion was widely 
circulated. It found its way to the influential publisher of the Washington 
Telegraph. He wrote to Edwards less than two weeks after the address, and 
 
contained in the State, is called eminent domain . . . . [and it] is everywhere considered inseparable 
from the sovereignty.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). 
235 Id. at 121. 
236 Id. (emphasis added). 
237 Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
238 Id. at 118. 
239 Id. at 119. 
240 Id. at 113. Edwards assumed away the problem posed by the silence of the Constitution 
regarding the power to acquire territory. See id. at 120 (arguing that Article 4, Section 3 of the 
Constitution only applies to territory “beyond the limits or boundaries of any other States” and that 
by admitting a State into the union, Congress has thus “released the claim of the United States to 
all lands that lie within it” (first quotation quoting 17 JOHNSON’S REPORTS 223)). 
241 Id. at 122. 
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declared that he was “prepared to defend” Illinois’s claim.242 He agreed with 
Edwards but warned that “I greatly doubt . . . your success before the 
Supreme Court. That Court, like other great things, dwindles as you 
approach it.”243 He would later write that if Illinois were to succeed in 
breaking federal title, it “will be the work of time, four years may not be 
enough. You	.	.	.	run butt against the Supreme Court	. . . . In that Court is 
lodged [John Marshall] the Tyrant, the monarch of this country.”244 The 
Telegraph’s editorial page then proclaimed to the Washington elite that “[t]he 
constitutional rights of the new States have never, until of late, been 
demanded. . . . Give the people light.”245 The paper implored “the West [to] 
examine and understand how far that system, which has made them tributary 
to the other States, is sanctioned by the Constitution, and the treaties of 
cession through which the Federal Government claims title . . . .”246 
Nearly all of the old states opposed the effort to cede the public lands to 
the new states. In January 1827, Senator Barton took the floor to urge Congress 
not to “rip up the goose that lays the golden eggs.”247 If Illinois’s argument 
were accepted, Barton continued, the opponents of federal title would 
“syllogi[ze]” themselves “out of the Union” because “[t]he same Constitution 
that authorizes the admission of new States[] also authorizes the [federal] 
holding and disposing of the Western lands	. . . .”248 Barton did not let the new 
states’ law-of-nations gloss on the eminent domain go unanswered. He 
explained that “[t]o talk of ‘eminent domain,’ and Vattel, in a case created and 
regulated by our own Constitution, is an idle affectation of learning.”249 
Notwithstanding the objections of old states, Edwards was joined in the 
Senate by other politicians who saw the utility of appealing to the new states’ 
interests—especially Senator John McKinley.250 In 1828, McKinley referred a 
 
242 Letter from Duff Green, Publisher of Wash. Tel., to Ninian Edwards, Governor of Ill. 
(Dec. 22, 1828), in 3 NINIAN W. EDWARDS, THE EDWARDS PAPERS 377, 378 (E. B. Washburne ed., 
Chicago, Fergus Printing Co. 1884). 
243 Id. at 379. 
244 Letter from Duff Green, Publisher of Wash. Tel., to Ninian Edwards, Governor of Ill. (Jan. 
6, 1829), in 3 NINIAN W. EDWARDS, THE EDWARDS PAPERS 379, 380-81 (E. B. Washburne ed., 
Chicago, Fergus Printing Co. 1884). 
245 WASH. TELEGRAPH, Apr. 24, 1828 (emphasis omitted). 
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247 3 REGISTER OF DEBATES IN CONGRESS 43 (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1829). 
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250 Professors Ablavsky and Leshy have recently elaborated Justice McKinley’s involvement 
with these public land disputes with more precision. See Gregory Ablavsky, The Rise of Federal Title, 
106 CAL. L. REV. 631, 675 (2018) (“McKinley fretted that [federal] ownership [of land under states’ 
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sovereignty’ . . . .”); see also John D. Leshy, Are U.S. Public Lands Unconstitutional?, 69 HASTINGS 
L.J. 499, 535 (2018) (highlighting that McKinley expressed that to “deny Alabama the ownership of 
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memorial from Alabama to the committee on public lands seeking the sale of 
all public land to the state.251 The proposal died in committee.252 
After the committee refused to act, McKinley took to the Senate floor, 
Vattel in hand, to argue that “the ablest jurists of ancient and modern times 
agree that sovereignty is necessarily and inseparably connected with the 
territory and right of soil over which it is exercised. So essential is this right, that 
sovereignty cannot exist without it.”253 He quickly drew out the implication: 
“the creation of a sovereign State over this territory	. . .	was of itself a transfer 
of the whole title to the land, and right of domain of the United States to the 
new States.”254 In short: The eminent dominion gives new states title. 
Like Edwards, McKinley dismissed the conditions placed on his state’s 
admission as nullities. “If the United States can enter into treaties or 
compacts with the new States for the acquisition of sovereignty,	. . .	she may 
do the same with the old States, and thereby change, amend, or destroy the 
fundamental law of the land . . . .”255 McKinley ominously warned that “[i]f 
the United States refuse to give or sell to us what we believe we are 
constitutionally entitled to, we	.	.	.	will continue to complain until we obtain 
our rights.”256 It was no idle threat: in 1837, McKinley was appointed to the 
Supreme Court, where he decided one crucial and profoundly misleading 
case—Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan.257 
In 1845, Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan came to the Supreme Court as a 
shopworn land-title case, involving a minor variation on a theme that had 
occupied the Court many times before. By way of background, once American 
sovereignty over Alabama territory was settled, Congress began to sort 
through complex property claims created by the administration of prior 
sovereigns. In 1824, Congress granted title to unoccupied water lots—which 
 
the beds of navigable waters would be ‘to deny that Alabama has been admitted into the union on 
an equal footing with the original states’” (quoting Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 229 (1845))). 
251 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 133 (Washington, D.C., 
Duff Green 1827). 
252 See JOHN MCKINLEY, SPEECH ON THE BILL TO GRADUATE THE PRICE OF PUBLIC 
LANDS 19 (Washington, D.C., Green & Jarvis 1828) (“A majority of that Committee decided against 
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253 4 REG. DEB. 509 (1828) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
254 Id. at 509-10 (emphasis added). 
255 Id. at 512; see also id. at 514 (“I have shown, by irresistible implication, that Congress 
believed that the new States would be entitled to the land within their limits, and all the other rights 
of eminent domain, of which they have been deprived . . . .”). 
256 Id. at 521. McKinley published the speech the month later and prefaced it with the hope 
that the reader would be led “to a full and fair investigation of the constitutional powers of the 
General and State Governments.” MCKINLEY, supra note 252, at 3. 
257 44 U.S. (1 How.) 212 (1845). 
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were below the high water mark of the Mobile River—to the city of Mobile.258 
The statute further provided, however, that if those lots had been improved, 
title was instead “vested in the several proprietors and occupants.”259 
Litigation ensued: could the improvers take title under the federal grant? 
In 1839, the Alabama Supreme Court embraced Illinois’s theory of the 
eminent dominion in denying the federal grant to the improvers. In City of 
Mobile v. Eslava,260 the City and Miguel Eslava each claimed title—Eslava as 
improver, Mobile under the broader grant. The Alabama court held that 
Congress is “incompetent	.	.	.	to grant the space intervening between high 
and low water marks” to the improvers.261 And, because Alabama is a coequal 
sovereign, “the rights of sovereignty of the new [states] are quite as extensive 
as those possessed by the original States.”262 
When Eslava arrived at the Supreme Court, the majority was 
unimpressed. The Court—sitting without Justice McKinley and Chief Justice 
Taney—simply ignored the lower court’s opinion.263 The case required 
statutory interpretation: was Eslava one of the individuals granted title to 
improved water lots?264 If Eslava was an improver, title was his.265 
Justice Catron lambasted the majority’s constitutional avoidance, 
especially the pretense that the Court could not take notice of the opinion 
below.266 He would have met Alabama’s constitutional theory directly: a treaty 
gave the federal government eminent dominion. Catron marveled that 
although it is “free from doubt” that “the United States acquired by cession 
all his powers over the vacant soil,” yet Alabama nevertheless contended that 
“the lands flowed by the tides are	.	.	.	part of [Alabama’s] sovereign rights.”267 
Catron detected a looming danger in the attempt to take the tide waters along 
the river: on that thin reed the state could hang a claim to all public lands.268 
When the Court followed the same path the next year in City of Mobile v. 
Emanuel, Catron added that it was now “established with a plainness 
admitting of no doubt, that Alabama	.	.	.	hold[s], by force of her judicial 
 
258 An Act Granting Certain Lots of Ground to the Corporation of the City of Mobile, and 
Certain Individuals of Said City, Pub. L. No. 18-185, 4 Stat. 66, 68-69 (1824). 
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decisions, all the lands within the state, flowed by tide water	.	.	.	.”269 If 
Alabama’s theory of the eminent dominion was right, Catron warned, it would 
undo the Court’s precedents.270 
The Court would indeed return to Alabama’s overflowed lands, though 
not until Justice McKinley introduced the new states’ eminent dominion into 
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. 
In Hagan, McKinley precisely traced Illinois’s eminent-dominion 
argument, and Vattel again supplied the necessary law-of-nations authority. 
The “eminent domain,” McKinley wrote, means “[t]he right which belongs to 
the society, or to the sovereign, of disposing, in case of necessity, and for the 
public safety, of all the wealth contained in the state . . . .”271 McKinley 
contended that the power of the eminent domain is “necessary” for 
sovereigns.272 Because McKinley could lay claim to the variegated law-of-
nations idea—in which sovereignty, jurisdiction, and title are commingled—
McKinley held that even if statutes and treaties granted the United States 
title, they are “void and inoperative” against the states “because the United 
States have no constitutional capacity to exercise municipal jurisdiction, 
sovereignty, or eminent domain, within the limits of a state or elsewhere, 
except in the cases in which it is expressly granted.”273 
These last few clauses of Hagan are historically significant, both because 
they reveal the law-of-nations genealogy of McKinley’s theory of the 
“eminent domain,” and because they would be abused in the century and a 
half that followed. Without further narrowing, McKinley’s rendition of the 
“eminent domain” would require a radical reordering of federal title. After 
all, McKinley’s theory of “eminent domain” was indistinguishable from 
Illinois’s argument that it held title to all public lands. 
The Hagan plaintiffs were shocked by the Court’s decision. Two weeks 
after the opinion came down, the improver’s counsel moved for reargument, 
admitting that “the question was regarded . . . as virtually settled . . . and 
consequently it was not argued with as much care and preparation as its great 
importance demanded.”274 Counsel observed that the Court’s new judgment 
“involves the title to all the lands professed to have been granted by the 
United States . . . as well as to vast quantities of land similarly 
circumstanced.”275 Although the suit ostensibly involved a tiny sliver of land 
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on the Mobile River, “[a]s was remarked by one of the members of the 
Court[,] this case turns upon a principle which involves a larger amount of 
property than perhaps ever was in any one suit . . . .”276 The Court overruled 
the motion a week later.277 
The predicted upheaval in federal title never came to pass. Alabama courts 
chose a narrow reading of Hagan: it applied only to the overflowed tidelands, 
nothing more.278 The court in Doe ex dem. Kennedy v. Bebee advised the bar that 
“[i]t is difficult to educe a harmonious system, even from the decisions of the 
federal judiciary, in respect to private land claims in the States acquired from 
France and Spain.”279 The court breathed a sigh of relief that “[t]his anomalous 
litigation, under the influence of the statute of limitations, . . . must be drawing 
to a close . . . .”280 
To further mitigate the unraveling of federal title, Chief Justice Taney 
summarized the Court’s activity when similar cases came to the Court: they 
all involved the simple argument that “the premises were a part of the shore 
of a navigable tide-water river, lying below high-water mark.”281 McKinley was 
again absent from the Court when Taney smoothed over the prior cases,282 and 
Hagan then faded to a minor decision in the environmental law canon.283 
McKinley’s gloss on the eminent dominion has since led two lives in the 
busy hands of constitutional lawyers. The least controversial reception of 
Hagan adopts Taney’s synthesis: it settled that the shore below the high-water 
mark belongs to the new states and the old states alike. McKinley’s broader 
designs for Hagan proved irresistible, however, as time progressed. 
One of the more important consumers of McKinley’s work was his 
successor on the Court: John Archibald Campbell. Campbell was intimately 
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distinctive federalism.284 Campbell’s most enduring contribution to the 
reception of Hagan in the constitutional canon was an act of legal error, 
committed in his concurrence to Dred Scott v. Sandford.285 In a passage 
attacking the effort to enlarge the free territory of the union, Campbell 
revived the new states’ vision of the eminent dominion—one that exceeded 
even McKinley’s elliptical prose. He wrote that in Hagan, 
[T]he Court say[s]: “The United States have no constitutional capacity to 
exercise municipal jurisdiction, sovereignty, or eminent domain, within the 
limits of a State or elsewhere, except in cases where it is delegated, and the court 
denies the faculty of the Federal Government to add to its powers by treaty or 
compact.”286 
Despite the quotation marks that surround it, all of the italicized material 
was Campbell’s gloss—not a holding by the Hagan Court. While the Hagan 
majority cautioned that no treaty could transfer “royal prerogatives” from the 
Spanish Crown to the general government,287 it did not, Campbell claimed, 
deny the federal government’s “faculty . . . to add to its powers by treaty.”288 
In Campbell’s hands, Hagan came to express an enduring limitation on the 
treaty-making power: no exercise of that power by the federal government 
could infringe upon the states’ sovereignty. Campbell’s gloss on Hagan then 
entered the twentieth century as a central piece of evidence that older 
generations had constrained the treaty-making power to account for states’ 
rights. So, for example, when a 1908 American Society of International Law 
(ASIL) conference addressed conflicts between treaties and state law, one 
professor quoted Justice Campbell’s Hagan concurrence as evidence that the 
Supreme Court had denied “the faculty of the Federal Government to add to 
its powers by treaty.”289 Hagan was then emblematic of the view that “there are 
constitutional limits [on the treaty power], despite the fact that the 
Constitution grants the power without limitation	. . . .”290 Because no principle 
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could unite these cases, the ASIL panelist insisted that our forebears left us an 
enduring puzzle: the Supreme Court would eventually have to choose between 
state and federal sovereigns in defining the limits of the treaty-making power.291 
As I shall describe in the next Part, the panelist’s rendition of Hagan was of 
a piece with the scholarship of his time. Constitutional historians writing during 
the early-twentieth century made certain that the foreign-affairs powers would 
start from a dual-sovereign premise but conclude with a vision of foreign-affairs 
power that favored the national government. As the panelist noted, the national 
government had lately acquired territory from other sovereigns “because other 
sovereign states possess this power. This, indeed, was the only basis upon which 
this act could be justified . . . .”292 In this way, the canonical constitutional 
history of the acquisition power and the eminent dominion were rewritten to 
shore up the federal sovereign’s power to practice imperial government. 
III. THE FOREIGN-AFFAIRS INTERNMENT OF POPULAR-SOVEREIGN 
FEDERALISM 
Nearly every prominent history of foreign-affairs federalism omits the 
history of the eminent dominion described above. As I argue in what follows, 
the prominent early-twentieth-century histories that frame the modern 
conversation about the treaty-making power were written to shore up our last 
episode of territorial conquest.293 
It is worth considering whether this inherited history conveys something 
immemorial about our constitutional structure, and whether the 
constitutional vision endorsed by this history misshapes our modern 
conversation. Two areas of the modern conversation trade upon this history: 
the status of former sovereigns’ territory acquired with the treaty-making 
power, and the scope of this power in light of American federalism. I discuss 
each in turn. 
A. The Sovereign’s Dominion and the Insular Histories 
The first decades of the twentieth century brought two jousting histories 
of the Constitution’s limitations on the treaty-making power and that power’s 
exercise in acquiring territory abroad. Despite some disagreement, both 
framed a vision of the government’s foreign-affairs power that assumed the 
truth of dual sovereignty and the conservation-of-powers thesis. That is to 
 
291 Id. at 203. 
292 Id. at 206. 
293 My claim that these treaty-power histories obscured earlier theories of the treaty-making 
power’s limitations should not be read to suggest that the earlier eras were anti-imperial. Rather, my 
claim is that these histories canonized an imperial treaty power. In so doing, these histories erased 
popular-sovereign federalism from courts’ modern conversation. 
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say, it became a truism of foreign-affairs federalism that all law-of-nations 
powers must have been distributed to the federal sovereign. 
1. Creating a Canonical History of an Imperial Treaty Power 
The first influential history of the treaty-making power was Charles Henry 
Butler’s two-volume opus on the treaty-making power, which concluded in 
1902 that “the treaty-making power . . . is derived not only from the powers 
expressly conferred by the Constitution, but . . . is also possessed . . . as an 
attribute of sovereignty . . . .”294 On this view, the popular sovereign had, in 
fact, given the federal government the full measure of foreign-affairs power 
that it might have otherwise given to the states.295 Accordingly, Congress could 
legislate “co-extensive[ly]” with a plenary treaty-making power.296 
Crucially for Butler, the prior century’s pattern of acquiring territory—
with no mention of the controversies described in the last Part of this 
Article—furnished evidence of the “nationality and sovereignty”297 of the 
federal government. That is because Butler thought that dual sovereignty and 
the proposition that all powers were distributed to the sovereign American 
governments were obvious: all sovereigns must have the “right” to “cede 
territory to, and to acquire territory from, other sovereign powers.”298 If a 
government cannot cede and acquire territory, that is because it “does not 
possess the full measure of sovereignty.”299 Citing the Court’s opinion in 
Canter, in which Marshall found the power of acquiring territory to be an 
implication of the federal government’s treaty-making or war-making power, 
Butler reasoned that since the federal government has not “surrendered any 
of its fully sovereign powers, as to the matters wholly within its own domain, 
the United States therefore possesses, in common with every other sovereign 
power, this right of acquisition of territory.”300 Indeed, in his sustained 
discussion of popular sovereignty in the United States, Butler emphasized 
that the “people retain only that portion of sovereignty” that has been neither 
delegated to the states nor held “by the United States in its national 
capacity.”301 So understood, popular sovereignty “is a part of the heritage of 
the Anglo-Saxon race” and will “naturally” exist in nations they compose.302 
Popular sovereignty “does not, however, necessarily exist naturally in people 
 
294 1 CHARLES HENRY BUTLER, THE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE UNITED STATES 5 (1902). 
295 Id. at 351. 
296 Id. at 5-6. 
297 Id. at 69-70. 
298 Id. at 72. 
299 Id. at 74. 
300 Id. at 77. 
301 Id. at 17. 
302 Id. 
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of other races.”303 The national treaty-making power can thus acquire 
territory—consistent with its full measure of foreign-affairs powers—yet it 
does not thereby enlarge the popular sovereign’s domain. After the acquisition 
of new people and new territory, it thus “remains for the United States to 
clothe the people of the ceded possessions . . . with the same degree of 
autonomy as other portions of our people possess.”304 
Butler acknowledged some historical skepticism regarding the power to 
acquire territory, but answered that Chief Justice Marshall had ended the 
matter in Canter long before the Texas and Maine disputes.305 In an oblique 
reference to the then-recent acquisition of the insular territories, Butler argued 
that “it must be conceded at the present time that questions relating to 
annexation	. . .	belong exclusively to the political departments of the 
government	. . . .”306 It was a belt-and-suspenders answer: the Supreme Court 
had blessed the acquisition of territory in the 1820s, and, in any event, the 
matter had become a political question that no court could now second guess. 
As to the question of cession (that is, Maine’s constitutional grievance), 
Butler did not acknowledge that there had ever been a cession of territory in 
the United States. He advanced only the disputed law-of-nations principle 
that “the consent of the inhabitants of territory, ceded by one sovereign power 
to another, is not required to validate the transfer . . . .”307 As we have seen, 
that position was disputed by law-of-nations publicists, and disregarded the 
Maine boundary settlement, but would be necessary if the federal government 
wished to acquire and hold foreign sovereignties as imperial possessions.308 
In 1915, Henry St. George Tucker wrote the second influential history of 
the treaty power as a rejoinder to Butler’s “nationalist” history.309 Tucker 
argued that it was necessary to look to the Constitution, not the law of nations, 




305 Id. at 116-17. 
306 Id. at 117. 
307 Id. at 83 (emphasis added). 
308 See generally FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE, supra note 11. In 1908, Robert Devlin 
similarly cited only Justice Marshall’s 1828 opinion in Canter for the principle that the government 
“possesses the power of acquiring territory.” ROBERT T. DEVLIN, THE TREATY POWER UNDER 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 307-08 (1908) (citing Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 
U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 512 (1828)). 
309 HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, LIMITATIONS ON THE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE 
UNITED STATES (1915); see also Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 881 (2014) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (citing Tucker’s work). 
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treaty-making] power.”310 He singled Butler out for special criticism.311 Tucker 
framed the problem as choosing which sovereign should be allowed to exercise 
the fullest measure of civil power. Tucker then advanced the modern critique 
of Missouri v. Holland: the treaty power must not be allowed to “annihilate 
others equally important and equally supreme,” such as the states.312 To say 
that the treaty-making power “may include the rights and powers of the 
citizens of the States not granted to the Federal Government,” Tucker argued, 
“is to claim a superiority for [federal] power over the	. . .	powers of the States, 
which are equally supreme with the treaty-making power.”313 
Unlike most post-Missouri treaty-power scholarship,314 Tucker 
acknowledged both the contest-of-sovereigns and the contest-of-
governments models of foreign-affairs federalism. He called the former 
“Jeffersonian” model and the latter “Hamiltonian.”315 The Jeffersonian school 
contended that “the States, prior to the adoption of the Constitution, existed 
as independent sovereigns; . . . and that from the reservoir of their original 
powers they granted certain ones to the Federal Government . . . .”316 The 
Hamiltonians, by contrast, view the Constitution as the result of the “whole 
mass of the people of the United States, giving the Federal Government the 
large powers contained therein and denying certain powers to the States.”317 
On that model, “[t]here is one reservoir from which flowed all powers, the 
people of the United States as one body politic.”318 Tucker elected the 
Jeffersonian model. On that view, the last clause of the Tenth Amendment 
was superfluous: in ratifying the Constitution, the states “gave part and 
 
310 TUCKER, supra note 309, at 3. Tucker’s book begins by claiming that the prior fifty years had 
witnessed America’s rise to international prominence and a concurrent increase in its international 
entanglements. Id. at 1. For the modern equivalent, see Bond, 572 U.S. at 895 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
311 See TUCKER, supra note 309, at 120 (“When Mr. Butler declares that the treaty-making 
power of the United States ‘extends to every subject that may be the basis of negotiation . . . between 
any of the powers of the world,’ it is evident that his statement is too broad.” (alteration in original)). 
312 Id. at 79. 
313 Id. Tucker illustrated his critique elsewhere by asking his audience to imagine the absurdity 
of a Frenchman selling liquor in Savannah, where blue laws prohibited local inhabitants from doing 
the same. The Frenchman, Tucker conjectured, could outfit a resplendent barroom and say to the 
local magistrate: “There is a treaty between France and this country which gives me the right over all 
your little local State laws to do business as I please.” HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE TREATY-MAKING POWER 1-2 (1917) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
314 But see Cleveland, Powers Inherent, supra note 58, at 268 (explaining that by the early-
twentieth century, “the assumption that all sovereign powers were held by either the national or 
state governments facilitated the conclusion that a power was held by the national government 
whenever state authority was inappropriate,” and that this assumption “eliminat[ed] the possibility 
that power had been reserved to the people”). 
315 TUCKER, supra note 309, at 329. 
316 Id. at 83. 
317 Id. 
318 Id. at 84. 
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retained part” of their sovereign powers, so that “the[] reserved powers 
referred to in the Tenth Amendment were supreme in their sphere.”319 On 
Tucker’s account, the Maine and Texas disputes supplied proof of the non-
supremacy of treaties: the acquisition of Texas by congressional resolution 
and the payment of funds to Maine proved only that treaties are not 
“supreme” over the House of Representatives.320 
Our modern history of the treaty power labors in the shadow of the 
histories written during the imperial era. Both Tucker’s and Butler’s histories 
prevalently appear in courts and scholars’ recent puzzling over the scope of 
the federal government’s treaty power. As I shall argue, the problem of 
territorial acquisition was critical context for the authors’ normative claims 
about the scope of the treaty-making power. 
2. Claiming Imperial Dominion over the Insular Territories 
Butler, Tucker, Moore, and even Brown—whose 1920 history of the 
Louisiana Purchase noted that the debates about the Insular Cases were so 
replete with references to the Louisiana Purchase they had become a “source 
book of constitutional documents” on the Purchase321—were all engaging 
with the contemporary fact of American imperial government.322 
Accordingly, their theories of foreign-affairs federalism accommodate that 
political reality. The history they created was either imperial from first 
principles, or imperial in fact, in light of the unimaginable impracticability of 
denying a power that had so evidently restructured the republic.323 
If one looks to elite legal opinion in the short period before the Insular 
Cases, the effort to give a legal and historical imprimatur to the power of the 
 
319 Id. 
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cannot “regulate the internal concerns of the country,” JOHN RANDOLPH TUCKER, 2 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 727 (Henry St. George Tucker ed. 1899), but assumed 
that territory could be acquired “by . . . cession from a foreign power.” Id. at 730. They agreed, 
moreover, that as to “the burning question of territorial expansion” raised in their own time, 
including matters of “citizenship, statehood, etc.,” a long line of decisions established the “power of 
Congress to govern the Territories of the United States.” Id. at 609 & n.1. 
321 BROWN, supra note 97, at 196. 
322 The Insular Cases is shorthand for a series of turn-of-the-century decisions in which the 
Supreme Court “settled the question of whether the United States could hold colonies indefinitely 
(taking sides . . . with the imperialists).” Christina Duffy Burnett, A Convenient Constitution? 
Extraterritoriality After Boumediene, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 1041 (2009); see also Christina Duffy 
Burnett & Burke Marshall, Between the Foreign and the Domestic, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC 
SENSE, supra note 11, at 2 (describing this era’s invention of the idea of unincorporated territories). 
On the question of the identity of the Insular Cases, see Burnett, supra, at 975 n. 4 (collecting sources 
on the question of which cases should number among the “insular cases”). Histories of the Insular 
Cases are flourishing. See generally, e.g., ERMAN, supra note 11. 
323 I owe this way of putting the point to Jean Galbraith. 
986 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 168: 931 
federal sovereign to acquire colonies by treaty comes into view. First, several 
of the most prominent constitutional histories invoked the acquisition power 
as a settled fait accompli of public law. Second, several prominent 
constitutional professors expressed confidence that courts would avoid the 
acquisition and political-status questions raised by imperial conquest by 
treating the whole field as a “political question.” And finally, the relevant 
bureaucrats and tastemakers of elite legal opinion heaped disdain on the 
theory that American federalism limits American governments’ power to 
acquire another sovereign state by treaty. 
For example, in New Haven, Chief Judge Simeon Baldwin taught his 
students the central lesson of the public-lands cases surveyed in the last Part of 
this Article. He explained that the “U.S. has a police power, as to its land in a 
State,”324 and after asking his students, “How far can [a treaty] alter State 
domestic institutions?” he answered: “Land it has.”325 Baldwin also penned an 
imperial history of the acquisition power for Congress. Months before the 
annexation of Hawaii in 1898, Baldwin described the “Historic Policy of the 
United States as to Annexation” and fully endorsed the power to acquire 
territory.326 Baldwin also blessed the Louisiana Purchase as prudent, calling “for 
action rather than deliberation.”327 The annexation of Louisiana was, moreover, 
sanctioned by “the lips of our greatest Chief Justice, John Marshall” in Canter.328 
Baldwin acknowledged that the question of “absor[bing] of a foreign 
sovereignty” by acquiring Texas posed some difficulties, but he answered that 
ordinary national elections—constitutional moments of a kind—had 
sanctioned the acquisitions.329 Baldwin’s upshot was that the intense public 
debate over the acquisition of Texas and its eventual settlement gave, as a 
matter of accomplished fact, “the popular branch equal powers as to the 
admission of a foreign State.”330 Baldwin then concluded by describing a 
steady parade of acquisitions—Alaska, Arizona, California, New Mexico—to 
demonstrate an unbroken practice sanctioning acquisition.331 
Harvard professor James Bradley Thayer—who had once so labored to 
rescue the idea of the “eminent domain” from its many abuses—joined his 
 
324 Lecture Notes of Simeon Eben Baldwin 203 (on file with Baldwin Family Papers, Yale 
MSSA, Group 55, Series VI, No. 202). 
325 Id. at 238. He appended to this conclusion a question, presumably for class discussion: 
“Land it has. Marriage?” Id. 
326 SIMEON EBEN BALDWIN, THE HISTORIC POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES AS TO 
ANNEXATION, S. REP. NO. 55-102, at 12 (1898). 
327 Id. at 6. 
328 Id. 
329 Id. at 7. 
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331 See id. at 9-15 (explaining the many acquisitions made by the United States in the 
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Yale colleague to defend the constitutional bona fides of imperial acquisition. 
On November 17, 1898, The World newspaper telegraphed both professors and 
asked whether the United States could “hold colonies” and what would be the 
“status of natives of and residents in any territory that may become part of 
the possessions of the United States?”332 Their answers ran together in print. 
Baldwin replied with a précis of the history he sent to Congress: “the 
United States can acquire territory by conquest or treaty in any part of the 
world . . . .”333 Baldwin allowed that “the framers of the Constitution probably 
did not contemplate a status intermediate between slavery and full citizenship” 
but he noted that the Constitution did not forbid the exclusion of the insular 
territories’ inhabitants from the union.334 Indeed, he continued, the Louisiana 
Purchase proved that the government may annex “without paying much 
deference to the desires of the inhabitants.”335 Like Baldwin, Thayer thought 
that “the United States has the same power to acquire and to hold colonies 
that any nation has. . . . The relation of colonies to the United States will be 
just what the political department chooses to make it.”336 As to the status of 
the territories, Thayer argued that there was no binding precedent: “The 
United States . . . can give its colonies any form of government it chooses.”337 
Thayer also famously published his imperial theory of acquisition in the 
Harvard Law Review.338 His argument expounded a version of dual-sovereign 
federalism in which all foreign-affairs powers are vested in the federal 
government. “If you ask what this nation may do in prosecuting the ends for 
which it was created,” Thayer wrote, “the answer is, [i]t may do what other 
sovereign nations may do.”339 Thayer denounced much of the angst about 
acquiring insular territories as “crying over spilled milk,”340 and he took the 
acquisition power to be so obvious as to require little elaboration.341 
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334 Id. 
335 Id. Baldwin did, however, split from Thayer on the question whether the “constitution 
follows the flag” to the new territories. See FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE, supra note 308, at 6 
(describing Thayer’s and Baldwin’s contrasting views on incorporation). 
336 James B. Thayer, Letter to the Editor, WORLD, Nov. 20, 1898, at 4. 
337 Id. 
338 James Bradley Thayer, Our New Possessions, 12 HARV. L. REV. 464 (1898). Thayer’s article 
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One important reader of Thayer’s defense of annexation was Moorfield 
Storey—an anti-imperialist and eventual founder of the NAACP. Storey’s 
public opposition to the acquisition and imperial government of the insular 
territories became a significant irritant to President Theodore Roosevelt and 
his Administration’s imperial government.342 
Storey and Thayer shared a table at a Boston dinner party in 1899 and 
debated whether Thayer’s writings about “our new possessions” could be 
squared with the American theory of government.343 From Abraham 
Lincoln’s speeches, Storey drew the argument that “[w]hen the white man 
governs himself, that is self-government; but when he governs himself and 
also governs another man . . . that is despotism.”344 Tackling Thayer’s 
imperialism directly, Storey contended that the argument that the federal 
government can do whatever other sovereigns can do misstates the 
Constitution’s distribution of power from the popular sovereign to its 
governments: “As against other nations the Federal government is 
sovereign. . . . As against its own citizens and subjects its powers are 
limited.”345 The question, he wrote, should instead be “what rights our agents, 
the President and Congress, have as against the persons whom they govern: 
what position we as a nation must take toward our citizens or subjects.”346 
Thayer replied to Storey in a private letter, condescending to note that 
“[i]n matters of State, as in life, it appears to me wiser and more helpful . . . to 
keep one’s inner state wholesome and sweet with these things [i.e., the 
Declaration of Independence], and then to turn in on his everyday practical 
questions with all the horse-sense that he can muster.”347 Rather than embrace 
the philosophy of government, Thayer counseled that “[i]n dealing with 
 
342 President Roosevelt, for example, wrote a letter to his Secretary of War, Elihu Root, to 
forward a letter he had received from Philippines Governor William Howard Taft. Taft described 
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practical questions we must deal with things as they are and build on what we 
find.”348 Thayer marshalled the “facts of three centuries” against Storey, and 
argued that our late acquisition of “various islands” was “valid by 
International Law. What Spain could do we can do.”349 Indeed, “[the] state of 
things means colonial government. We are in for it, and can’t escape it.”350 
For Thayer, the Constitution must be “read side by side with the fact that 
it created a nation, with all the prodigious implications of that fact.”351 One 
implication was more prodigious than the rest: “Much, under such an 
instrument will be ‘unconstitutional but legal,’ . . . . Our protection 
here . . . is in other things than courts.”352 
By the end of the year in which Baldwin and Thayer penned their defenses 
of annexation, the Secretary of War prefaced his report to the President on 
“Insular Government” by “assum[ing], for I do not think that it can be 
successfully disputed, that all acquisition of territory [by the United States 
over the insular possessions] was the exercise of a power which belonged to 
the United States, because it was a nation, and for that reason was endowed 
with the powers essential to national life . . . .” 353 The obviousness of 
annexation—and even annexation of other fully formed sovereignties—was 
now expressed as settled wisdom: all sovereign powers, even imperial power, 
must have been distributed to the federal government. 
By 1900, a treatise on the constitutional law of the “public domain” (that 
is, McKinley’s “eminent domain”) admitted that the “[i]nherent [p]ower of a 
[n]ation to [a]cquire [t]erritory” had been one “of the great struggles between 
political parties of the United States,” but explained that acquisition had been 
settled as an “inherent power.”354 Although the acquisition of “disconnected” 
territory stretched the inherent-power theory furthest,355 nevertheless “the 
people of the United States, as sovereign owners .	. . have supreme power 
over [territories] and their inhabitants. In the exercise of this sovereign 
dominion, they are represented by the government of the United States.”356 
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During the same period, the law officer of the War Department’s Insular 
Affairs Division prepared dozens of reports on the legal entanglements 
created by the acquisition of the insular territories. In February 1900, he 
submitted an elaborate report on the “Legal status of the territory and 
inhabitants of the islands” America had conquered. He asserted plainly that 
“[t]he United States derives the right to acquire territory from the fact that 
it is	. . .	a sovereign nation. Such a nation has an inherent right to acquire 
territory.”357 Indeed, consistent with its sovereignty, the acquisition of 
territory simply increased the country’s landed wealth while leaving its 
inhabitants outside of United States government: “The subsequent erection 
[within acquired territory] of a political entity or government	. . .	and the 
bestowal of citizenship upon the inhabitants are acts of grace on the part of 
the new owner or sovereign.”358 As a sovereign conqueror possessed of the 
eminent dominion, the “President	.	.	.	presents to Congress the territory of 
said islands as so much property, seized as a spoil of war and to be dealt with 
by the sovereign people of the United States as shall be determined by that 
sovereign’s will.”359 In sum, the insular territories were part of the American 
sovereign’s eminent dominion. 
Like Thayer and Baldwin, the legal advisor concluded that dual-sovereign 
federalism and the conservation-of-powers thesis made the federal 
government’s foreign-affairs power plenary. That is to say, “[i]n the 
redistribution of sovereign powers made by the people	.	.	.	[the] National 
Government exercises every sovereign power not expressly prohibited by the 
Constitution, for the reason that the National Government in our 
international relations represents the sovereign people; the States have no 
international standing, powers, or existence.”360 The possibility that the 
popular sovereign had reserved some of the sovereign powers described by 
the law of nations—especially in determining the composition of the 
American people—was purged from legitimate constitutional argument. 
Seven months later, the legal advisor wrote another opinion to 
supplement his treatment of the acquisition power based on a review of 
“important incidents of our national history.”361 He turned first to the 
Louisiana Purchase. Jefferson, like the modern administration, had to deal 
with the accusation that he was an “imperialis[t],” and his opponents 
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“exhibited quite as much alarm as do the antiexpansionists of to-day.”362 In an 
accurate recitation of the earlier legal theory opposing acquisition, the advisor 
reported that at the time of the Louisiana Purchase, the idea that the 
President, “exercising only the authority to make treaties,”363 could acquire 
and incorporate territory “was declared to be absurd and a usurpation of 
authority possessed by kings and kings’ councils.”364 And after reciting the 
floor debates used by those who opposed the acquisition of Texas (Webster, 
Story, and Channing), the advisor admitted that during earlier eras of 
constitutional history, “no one believed that the President and Senate could 
extend the boundaries of the United States by treaty stipulations, or 
incorporate foreign territory into the United States	.	.	.	.”365 Indeed, in a 
complete restatement of Massachusetts’s and Maine’s brand of federalism, the 
legal advisor explained that “additions to the realm and the privilege of 
participating in the Government were matters to be determined by the 
sovereign, and that in the United States the sovereign was the people and not 
the President or the Senate.”366 
The advisor’s answer to the anti-imperialists’ theory of popular-sovereign 
federalism was that politics had chosen a victor: “That Jefferson was an 
expansionist admits of no denial. His greatest glory was derived from the 
acquisition of Louisiana	.	.	.	.”367 In the advisor’s view, Jefferson’s election 
furnished a constitutional moment that blessed the propriety of acquiring 
territory by treaty and subjecting its inhabitants’ political status to Congress’s 
legislative power. By presidential election, “[t]he course pursued by 
[Jefferson] in the acquisition and government of Louisiana was submitted to 
the people,” and Jefferson won overwhelmingly.368 Accordingly, the advisor 
concluded that now the “great power of the sovereign was vested	.	.	.	in the 
people,” and—crucially—that “[t]he will of the sovereign people in regard [to 
acquisition and government of new territory] was to be declared by the 
legislative department of the [federal] Government.”369 
The Insular Bureau’s use of the law-of-nations idea of eminent dominion 
was not clean, however. Just a year prior, the same legal advisor had opined 
that once the fact of annexation was accomplished, the Constitution must 
then apply, by its own force, in the acquired territory. That is to say, once the 
war of conquest ended, the federal government would “cease[] to derive its 
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authority from the laws and usages of war,” and would instead “bec[o]me 
subject to the Constitution and laws of the United States.”370 Remarkably, the 
advisor quoted Justice McKinley’s treatment of the eminent dominion in 
Hagan for the proposition that acquired territory must be held “subject to the 
constitution and laws of [the American sovereign’s] own government.”371 In 
short, when the Insular Bureau’s lawyer first addressed the question of the 
possession’s legal status, he concluded that the Constitution would follow the 
flag: the insular possessions were “now a civil government, subject to and 
controlled by the Constitution and Federal laws of the United States.”372 
The advisor’s apparent about-face concerning the application of the 
Constitution to the insular territories became public when an anti-imperialist 
Congressman quoted the earlier opinion on the floor. That member opposed 
the developing colonial policy, which included differential tariffs on goods 
from the new territories, by arguing that the President’s party intended to 
“convert this Republic into an empire in fact.”373 In response to the floor 
statements and an official request for the earlier opinion concluding that the 
Constitution follows the flag, the War Department furnished the opinion to 
Congress with the caveat that it had been deemed to be “not	.	.	.	well 
founded.”374 The War Department and Congress ordered the Insular Bureau’s 
legal opinions published in the summer of 1902, to the approval of significant 
taste-makers of legal culture.375 
Most significantly, the Insular Bureau’s archival records contain a seventy-
six page document bearing a handwritten notation that the “undated and 
unsigned” memorandum was “probably” composed “by Sec’y of War [Elihu] 
Root.”376 The document concerned “the rights of U.S. to hold and govern 
newly acquired territory.”377 As described in what follows, that memorandum 
describes the culmination of the ideological development traced in the 
foregoing Parts: it advanced the arguments that the federal government, not 
the states, holds a sovereign’s eminent dominion; that in matters of foreign 
 
370 CHARLES E. MAGOON, RELATIONS OF PUERTO RICO TO THE CONSTITUTION, H.R. 
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affairs the federal government is properly conceived of as an absolute sovereign 
in which all powers at international law are reposed; and that from these 
premises it follows that the federal sovereign holds a power of acquiring 
territory and practicing colonial government within it. 
The first half of the memorandum is devoted to a question that “at first 
sight seem[s] to present unsurmountable difficult[y]”378—that is, the source 
of the power of the federal government to acquire territory notwithstanding 
the Constitution’s silence regarding that power. The memorandum argued 
that a century of practice as well as Marshall’s early opinion in Canter 
“necessarily remove[d] all these apparent complications . . . and clearly 
demonstrate[d] the absolute power of the National Government, not only to 
acquire, but also to subsequently govern, all territory which may come under 
its jurisdiction in any manner whatsoever.”379 To resolve the constitutional 
“complication,” the memorandum explained, it was necessary to bear in mind 
a central distinction “between the control of matters which belong to the 
separate States”—as to which the “United States are a federation”380—and the 
“control by Congress of matters affecting the general property which belongs 
to all the States”381—as to which the federal government acts as a trustee. 
Because Congress controls the eminent dominion as a “nation,” the 
memorandum continued, all constitutional “limitations so far as the central 
government is concerned . . . cannot relate to the control of territory and 
property which belongs to the United States as a whole.”382 
Once this federal eminent dominion was fully accepted, the memorandum 
continued, it was possible to understand three related propositions: (1) the 
power to acquire territory; (2) the constitutional power of Congress to govern 
“such acquired territory”; and (3) the status of the inhabitants with respect to 
“the United States as a governing power.”383 
Turning first to “the right of the United States to acquire new territory,” 
the memorandum cautioned that “before the source of the right	. . .	can be 
clearly understood, it is necessary to thoroughly appreciate what the 
Government of the United States is	. . . .”384 The answer, the author 
explained, turned on what I have labeled dual-sovereign federalism and the 
conservation-of-powers thesis: with respect to “those matters	. . .	over which 
no particular state can exercise any control,” the federal government “as vested 
in, and wielded by, Congress and the Executive, is an absolutely sovereign power, 
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subject only to” the Constitution’s express limitations.385 Such limitations “are 
very few,” such as the right of habeas corpus or, after the Thirteenth 
Amendment, a prohibition on “the institution of slavery in any form.”386 
The author admitted that his “declaration of the absolute sovereignty of 
Congress may for a moment appear startling and even repugnant,” but he 
countered that “a moment’s reflection” reveals that “there is nothing whatever 
derogatory to the dignity or prejudicial to the interests of any State, in 
granting the fullest possible power over foreign relations or territorial matters 
to the Central Government.”387 To be sure, states “can well be jealous” of their 
“sovereignty over their own internal affairs,” but as to matters that are 
“conducted by Congress for the general good of the Union,” the institutions 
of federal government must possess plenary power.388 
Root thought that any alternative version of foreign-affairs federalism 
would be absurd because unless the federal sovereign holds a plenary foreign-
affairs power (here expressed as a national treaty-making power to acquire 
territory), any alternative distribution of sovereignty would “necessarily 
result[] in a diminution or loss of sovereignty to the general Government, and 
thereby the entire Union, which can never be restored.”389 Indeed, identifying 
the argument that a power might have been withheld from all American 
governments by a popular sovereign—that is, the central claim of 
Massachusetts’ or Maine’s popular-sovereign federalism—was, in the author’s 
view, enough to disprove it: such an argument would leave the national 
government “in the undignified position of being less than a sovereign state 
and not able to negotiate in regard thereto.”390 Extensively quoting a mid-
nineteenth-century Attorney General’s opinion, the memorandum 
emphasized that “if the power of negotiation be not in the United States, then 
it exists nowhere, and one great field of international relation . . . is closed 
up . . . .”391 Crucially, therefore, it followed that “[t]his element of complete 
sovereignty as to all matters other than th[o]se in which the States themselves 
are separately interested . . . can be exercised in a thoroughly effective manner 
only by a supreme Government possessed of absolutely complete sovereignty.”392 
Indeed, the memorandum continued, “in regard to all such matters as are now 
under consideration”393—that is, the power to acquire territory by treaty and 
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Congress’s power to govern it as a colony—the United States “is a sovereign 
nation, and . . . its Central Government has powers which are co-extensive 
with the power of any other sovereign nation, no matter what its form of 
government may be, whether autocratic, limited monarchy, or republican.”394 
The treaty-making power was thus national and imperial: it expressed a 
vision of the federal government’s sovereignty that is so absolute—and so 
disconnected from the conceit of popular sovereignty—that it could even be 
autocratic or imperial. 
The War Department’s defense of imperial acquisition and government 
aligned with elite legal opinion of the time. By 1912, Secretary of War Henry 
Stimson was recommending citizenship for Puerto Rican inhabitants but 
cautioned that “the grant of citizenship does not, and should not postulate 
eventual statehood	.	.	.	.”395 His Legal Advisor, Felix Frankfurter, similarly 
advised the Attorney General of Puerto Rico, “I feel very strongly that if the 
public opinion of this country is against statehood . . . our dealings with the 
Island . . . will be furthered by a frank, even an unnecessarily frank, statement 
of our intentions.”396 The “frank” statement that the territory would never 
become a state “will serve to build up a tradition against any possible partisan 
temptation of the future” while “prevent[ing] the raising of false hopes” 
among Puerto Ricans.397 And, of course, the idea of imperial government and 
the doctrine of incorporation of conquered territory eventually received the 
sanction of the Supreme Court in the Insular Cases. 
But in the interstices of insular government, the conceit that the popular 
sovereign might reserve some powers from its governments recurred. 
For example, just after the conquest of Puerto Rico but before Congress 
had legislated a municipal code for the territory, insular authorities had to 
determine whether corporations could be created during the interregnum.398 
So, when several Puerto Rican beer-making entrepreneurs applied to create a 
corporation with special immunities from taxation,399 the insular authorities 
demurred, citing Hagan: “When Porto Rico was ceded to the United States 
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our Federal Government did not succeed to the prerogatives	.	.	.	inherent in 
the Crown of Spain under the monarchy. Our Federal Government has never 
been authorized to receive or . . . secure said prerogatives by transfer from a 
monarch or otherwise	.	.	.	.”400 Because no federal officer could inherit the 
powers of a Spanish bureaucrat, the insular authorities continued, no 
corporate charters could be granted.401 The adviser admonished the public 
that “attention is directed to the fact that the conqueror in this instance is the 
sovereign people of the United States,” and accordingly Congress would have 
to permit corporate charters.402 
As another example, after the American government’s conquest of the 
Philippines, the Manila Railway Company applied for past-due interest 
payments guaranteed by the Crown.403 While the insular authorities admitted 
that a “sovereignty securing the territory secures all the rights and privileges 
and assumes all the obligations of the previous sovereign,” they concluded 
that this doctrine was “inaccurate” in the United States.404 This law-of-
nations doctrine, they reasoned, does not extend to the United States because 
of the “character of [American] government.”405 It was “impossible” for the 
United States government to acquire the rights and obligations of a monarch, 
since it was different in form to the foreign sovereign.406 
The Insular Bureau’s position on corporate charters and interest payments 
was consistent, of course, with the superseded legal opinion on whether the 
Constitution follows the flag: if the Constitution displaced the law of nations 
after conquest, then international law was inapt. Thus, relying on Hagan, the 
legal officer could contend that no American government could receive the 
sovereign prerogatives of another sovereign by the contrivance of a treaty. 
The Insular Bureau’s varied positions on the federal government’s powers 
in the territories rendered the Bureau’s calculus of imperial public law 
confused: in what way, precisely, was the federal government “sovereign” over 
these possessions? 
Ultimately, the contradiction between the insular authorities’ invocation of 
the sovereign’s acquisition power, on the one hand, and a limited federal 
government, on the other, yielded the general theory that the creature that 
conquered the insular territories could act as a sovereign but not as a government. 
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More generally, as these interregnum decisions of the Insular Bureau 
demonstrate, the compatibility of American government with the law-of-
nations idea of the eminent dominion became a central point of dispute about 
the limits on the government’s treaty-making and foreign-affairs powers. 
Thayer and the War Department’s lawyers’ imperial views reflected the 
political realities of their time, and foreshadowed the settlement that the main 
treaty-power histories would parrot a decade later.407 That is to say, American 
federalism was by then framed by dual sovereignty, and the new histories 
assigned all law-of-nations powers to an “absolute” federal sovereign. 
3. The Imperial Dominion in The New Insular Cases 
Given the evidence that several of the most influential early-twentieth-
century histories of the treaty power embraced the brute fact of imperial 
government, what are we to make of eminent-dominion problems that 
continue to arise in America’s overseas territories? To be sure, the 
forthrightness with which these public lawyers embraced the fact of imperial 
acquisition is, across the distance of time, difficult to judge by their lights and 
their politics. But it is imperative that we judge them by our lights, since the 
sovereignty of the newest possessions remains an open question. 
In deciding the 2016 case Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, for example, the 
Court charged once more into the breach between sovereignty and 
government to answer a straightforward question: should the Constitution’s 
double-jeopardy clause protect defendants in Puerto Rico in the same 
(limited) way that it protects citizens of ordinary states?408 
In Sanchez Valle, the respondents had been indicted for offenses arising from 
the same course of conduct by both Commonwealth and federal grand juries.409 
After pleading guilty to the federal charges, they contended that the 
Commonwealth’s charges were now barred by the Fifth Amendment’s Double 
Jeopardy Clause.410 Their conviction of the federal crime, they argued, prohibited 
their being put in jeopardy once more for the “same offense.”411 The 
Commonwealth replied that like any other American state, it should be considered 
a “different separate sovereign[] for dual-jeopardy purposes,” and therefore it 
could prosecute the respondents regardless of the federal conviction.412 
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Six members of the Court decided that Puerto Rico was not a government 
possessing sovereignty of the right kind to entitle it to the separate-sovereign 
exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause.413 The Court’s majority opinion 
rests almost entirely on a peculiar history of the eminent dominion. 
In the opening paragraphs of its opinion, the Sanchez Valle Court found 
that Puerto Rico was not a sovereign for dual-jeopardy purposes because “the 
oldest roots of Puerto Rico’s power to prosecute lie in federal soil.”414 What 
follows is a dispassionate recitation of the federal conquest and annexation of 
the territory, Congress’s beneficent but halting authorization of “self-
governance,” and finally the creation of “a new political entity.”415 All of this 
“historical, not functional”416 evidence proved, the Court said, that the right 
of soil over Puerto Rico—the eminent dominion—was federal.417 Most 
remarkably, given the vexed origins of the new states’ eminent dominion, the 
Sanchez Valle majority decided that Puerto Rico’s status as a political entity 
did not accord with the “ordinary” meaning of sovereignty.418 
Ultimately, the Court decided that, notwithstanding its practical 
functioning as a state, the government failed a “historical” test of its “ultimate 
source of	.	.	.	power”: Puerto Rican sovereignty is lesser than that sovereignty 
exercised by the former territories now made states of the union.419 The 
authorities cited by the Court for that proposition, in turn, rest expressly on 
the eminent-dominion principle that Justice McKinley advanced in Hagan: 
the “new” states were “admitted with all the powers of sovereignty and 
jurisdiction which pertain to the original states.”420 
In its historicist understanding of insular government, the Court could 
not have provided a clearer summary of the earlier views of the eminent 
dominion—that federal soil, dominion, jurisdiction, and sovereignty are 
coextensive. As we have seen, the “ordinary” and “historical” meaning of 
federal sovereignty over soil—that is, the eminent dominion—was 
profoundly contested, especially when the historical aperture is opened to 
take in the nineteenth-century debates over the acquisition, cession, and title 
to land. In Puerto Rico’s case, as War Department lawyers and pro-imperial 
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academics aimed to make certain, what the Court called the “deepest 
wellsprings”421 of Puerto Rico’s authority was a “sovereign” Congress.422 
As we have seen, the doctrinal settlements on which the modern Court 
relied were motivated, in turn, by a desire to wrest dominion from the federal 
government in the mid-nineteenth century and the desire to elevate the fait 
accompli of imperial government into the constitutional canon in the early-
twentieth. In attending to only the victors of the earlier constitutional battles, 
the Court’s “historical” approach to determining whether the possessions’ 
inhabitants enjoy the practical rights of living under local American 
government (as against subjection to federal sovereignty) is dubious. 
Yet, in light of Sanchez Valle, the Court’s historicist gloss now defines the 
political status of persons governed by a federal dominus.423 If one takes the 
Court’s historicist conceit seriously, it is far from clear why the federal 
government’s exercise of eminent dominion in acquiring the insular territories 
is not identical in kind to the original source of power by which the new states—
like Illinois or Alabama—flowed into the United States. The new states, like 
the insular possessions, grew from the federal sovereign’s confident embrace of 
its power of eminent dominion. Indeed, they entered the union despite 
Massachusetts’s argument that the “disposition of its sovereignty” cannot be “a 
subject of barter by governments,”424 and despite never obtaining the 
“sovereignty” they claimed over public land held by the federal government. 
To be sure, the Sanchez Valle majority advanced an answer to the 
“literalist”425 objection that the new states, no less than the insular territories, 
have “roots” in “federal soil.”426 The Court’s answer was Justice McKinley’s 
answer in Hagan.427 As in Hagan, the Court held that the admission of the 
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new states into the union invested them with the eminent dominion—a 
confused bric-a-brac of sovereignty, jurisdiction, title, and soil. “[E]ach later-
admitted State exercises its authority to enact and enforce criminal laws by 
virtue not of congressional grace, but of the independent powers that [their] 
earliest counterparts both brought to the Union and chose to maintain.”428 
The more vexed history of the United States’ century of acquiring new 
territory and admitting new states from that territory thus obscured, the 
Sanchez Valle majority could freely argue that the new states’ sovereignty 
follows from “the most fundamental conceptual premises of our 
constitutional order, indeed the very bedrock of our Union.”429 
It has been nearly two hundred years since Ninian Edwards and Justice 
McKinley invented their theory of the eminent-dominion in an effort to wrest 
title to the public land away from the federal government. They lost. But the 
ideological apparatus they injected into the U.S. Reports—of a dual-
sovereigntist theory of the eminent dominion—now serves as the principle 
distinguishing the new states from the imperial colonies. The Court now 
looks upon federal dominion over the insular territories not with Thayer’s 
practical “horse-sense”—that is, by asking what powers they now exercise as 
a matter of fact—but rather with his admonition that the territories’ 
“protection	.	.	.	is in other things than courts.”430 
B. Treaty-Making Without Absolute Dual Sovereignty 
The passage of the problem of conquest and annexation from 
constitutional aporia to accomplished fact in the early-twentieth century 
settled only that era’s most vexing practical question about the scope of the 
treaty-making power. Elihu Root’s peculiar framing of the treaty-making 
power—that is, asking whether the treaty-making power’s evident nationality 
(as against the states) also makes it imperial—must assume, first, that no 
popular sovereign reserved the power of practicing imperial government away 
from its government. Indeed, for Root and lawyers of his generation, the 
nationality of the treaty-making power funded the conclusion that the federal 
government’s foreign-affairs powers are “co-extensive” with every other 
nation—even “autocratic” or “monarchical” imperial sovereigns. 
To be sure, Root admitted that the treaty-making power could not 
recreate a slave-holding republic or suspend habeas corpus, but these “very 
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few” limitations follow only from the express terms of the Suspension Clause 
and the Thirteenth Amendment. Root’s imperial view was that the federal 
government’s “full and completely sovereign rights have but the single 
limitation—that those personal and natural rights which all individuals 
possess, and the preservation of which is the object of all honestly conducted 
governments, cannot be destroyed.”431 
Yet, as we have seen, the move from a national treaty-making power to an 
imperial one was neither obvious nor historically straightforward. Contrary to 
Root’s imperial project, could one accept the evident nationality of the treaty-
making power—as against the states—without accepting the supremacy of the 
treaty-making power as against the popular sovereign? In other words, what 
would the treaty-making power look like if it were taken to be plausible that 
some law-of-nations powers were denied to all American governments by 
their popular sovereign? 
In light of the larger history of the eminent-dominion powers traced in 
this Article, we should rethink the frame through which we currently debate 
the scope of the treaty-making power. In this final subpart, I return to the 
question whether and how the treaty-making power should be limited. 
1. The Eminent Dominion in Missouri v. Holland 
As I have argued, while it is now thought that Chief Justice Marshall 
resolved for good the question of whether the federal government possesses 
the eminent-dominion power to acquire and hold title to territory, the 
historical record simply does not bear this out—the issue was central to thirty 
years of constitutional debate after Marshall’s engagement with the issue and 
was a persistent feature of late-nineteenth-century anti-imperialism. And 
while it is now thought that the federal government’s treaty-making power has 
not once been limited in fact,432 the public law litigation of earlier eras suggests 
that this article of faith about the treaty power is untrue. But of course the 
early decades of the twentieth century brought the Supreme Court’s principal 
discussion of the treaty power, in the 1920 decision Missouri v. Holland.433 
Today, Holland remains the single modern case that defines the federal 
government’s capacity to legislate pursuant to the treaty power434—a decision 
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that “set off a maelstrom that has ebbed and flowed for over nine decades,” 
including the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Bond v. United States.435 
Crucially, Holland emerged from deeper currents of constitutional 
reasoning about the sovereign’s eminent dominion—its power to acquire, 
cede, and hold title to property—traced throughout this Article. In the 
remaining pages, I aim to demonstrate that Holland was in fact a waystation 
between a world in which it was plausible for constitutional partisans to joust 
about which sovereign (popular, federal, or state) holds the eminent 
dominion, and the emergence of the now-dominant theory of dual-sovereign 
foreign-affairs federalism. The latter theory of dual-sovereign federalism—
embraced by proponents of an imperial, nationalist treaty-making power and 
states-rights critics of the treaty-making power alike—has struggled to offer 
an intelligible theory of the treaty power’s limits ever since. 
The beginning of the Holland controversy is usually dated to 1904, when 
Congress first undertook an “active effort	.	.	.	to gain federal protection for 
migratory birds.”436 Congress passed ordinary legislation that was held 
unconstitutional in various lower courts.437 Undaunted, Congress passed a 
similar statute pursuant to a treaty regulating the same subject matter.438 This 
commonplace brief of the case suggests a dual-sovereigntist frame for the 
constitutional question presented: the state and the federal sovereigns 
advanced competing claims to a “police power,” on the one hand, and “implied 
attributes of sovereignty,” on the other, that collided in a debate about 
whether the federal government could regulate bird hunting within the 
states.439 Thus, the proponents of the federal statute are thought to have 
invoked a “plenary national power in foreign affairs” to displace the states’ 
power to act as “trustees	.	.	.	of animals	.	.	.	within their boundaries.”440 
On the nationalist view of the treaty power, Congress’s passage of the 
statute pursuant to a treaty engaged a broader fund of absolute sovereign 
power. As George Sutherland put it just before his elevation to the Supreme 
Court, Elihu Root had it right: “the treaty-making power was never possessed 
or exercised by the states separately	.	.	.	whatever else may be reserved to the 
states by the Tenth Amendment, no part of the treaty-making power can 
possibly be included.”441 Indeed, Sutherland continued, it was a mistake to 
consider the treaty-making power to be “distributed” at all: “it is all vested in 
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the National government.”442 Accordingly, “its full exercise necessarily 
devolves upon the general government as the only possible agency	.	.	.	.”443 
Sutherland and Root’s history of Holland thus puts the powers of two 
sovereign governments in opposition: should the plenary federal treaty-
making power or the state police power win out?444 
The Office of the Attorney General of Missouri, whose head had been 
charged with violating the “bird bill,” joined a suit challenging the statute 
before the Supreme Court. His office framed Missouri’s case using the 
language of the sovereign’s eminent dominion. Indeed, what is most 
important about Holland is the extent to which the case represented the last 
chapter of the eminent-dominion argument traced throughout this Article. 
Missouri’s brief set out to “revive	.	.	.	the atmosphere breathed by those 
who framed	.	.	.	the Constitution of the United States.”445 The most 
important ambient idea to be revived was the eminent dominion: “Under the 
ancient law, feudal law, and the common law	.	.	.	the absolute control of wild 
game was an attribute of government and a necessary incident of 
sovereignty.”446 Missouri’s argument was thus that its own “trust 
right	.	.	.	 [in] the title to all wild game” foreclosed a treaty that would 
regulate the birds.447 By virtue of its eminent dominion, Missouri had title to 
the birds. And, as McKinley had established in Hagan, “Missouri, upon her 
admission to the Union,	.	.	.	became entitled to and possessed of all the rights 
and dominion and sovereignty which belonged to the original states.”448 
Replacing “wild game” with “overflowed lands” in Missouri’s brief would 
make it accord exactly with the question at issue in Hagan in 1845.449 Missouri 
took itself to be making a straightforward Hagan argument: like the tidelands, 
title to the birds vested in the states by virtue of their eminent dominion. 
 
442 Id. at 157 (adopting language that Sutherland attributed to Root). 
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444 Sutherland sent this history to the Senator who authored the migratory bird statutes, who 
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Viewed against this backdrop, Justice Holmes’s majority opinion in Holland 
does not seem as gaunt as modern commentators have suggested.450 Holmes’s 
critical move was to reject Missouri’s eminent-dominion argument out of hand. 
Despite hundreds of pages of briefing on the subject, Holmes noted only in 
passing that “[t]he State also alleges a pecuniary interest” in the birds.451 The 
limits of the treaty power, Holmes concluded, must be “ascertained in a 
different way.”452 While a state may “regulate the killing and sale of [migratory] 
birds, . . . it does not follow that its authority is exclusive of paramount powers 
[in the federal government]. To put the claim of the State upon title is to lean 
upon a slender reed.”453 Whatever had been reserved to the states by American 
federalism, Holmes held, it was not a sovereign’s “eminent dominion.” 
In a pregnant omission, Holmes left the question of sovereignty in 
suspense: “We must consider what this country has become in deciding what 
[the Tenth] amendment has reserved.”454 Thus, in a terse holding that has 
infuriated his skeptics, Holmes concluded that the states’ interests must give 
way. Migratory birds represent “a national interest of very nearly the first 
magnitude	.	.	.	. It can be protected only by national action in concert with 
that of another power.”455 Because treaties can solve “matters of the sharpest 
exigency for the national well being,”456 the treaty power ought to supplement 
Congress’s ordinary legislative powers. 
In short, Holmes rejected Missouri’s claim to a sovereign’s dominion over 
the birds, and thus Justice McKinley’s exotic argument drawn from the law of 
nations was eclipsed by a pragmatist’s view of government. 
There is more evidence, beyond the briefs, that underscores the extent to 
which Holland distanced the Court from the idea of dual-sovereign eminent 
dominion. Two weeks before Holland was argued, Tucker sent his above-
described anti-“nationalist” history of the treaty power to Justice 
McReynolds. In his letter, Tucker noted that the Court’s work “promises to 
be quite important—especially in respect to the proposed League of 
Nations.”457 Tucker confessed that he was “look[ing] to your Court to give to 
us our Constitutional form of Government—you are in fact our tabula in 
 
450 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 873-74 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing 
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453 Id. at 434 (emphasis added). 
454 Id. 
455 Id. at 435. 
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457 Letter from Henry St. George Tucker to James McReynolds, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme 
Court (Feb. 17, 1920) (on file with Library of the Supreme Court of the United States). 
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naufragio” and encouraged the Justice to look to Chapters IV and V of his 
history for an argument against a national view of the treaty-making power.458 
Justice McReynolds replied to thank Tucker for the book, and about a 
month later—less than a week before Holland was decided—Tucker wrote 
again. Tucker was more direct, and encouraged McReynolds to review 
“Chapter 4 of the book	.	.	.	especially Paragraph 70.”459 In that paragraph, 
Tucker advanced the modern critique of Missouri v. Holland: the treaty power 
must be constrained to avoid “annihilat[ing] others equally important and 
equally supreme.”460 Because treaties can encompass anything, a broad view of 
the federal government’s treaty-making power “may embrace every right or 
power of the people, pertaining not only to their national but to their State and 
local rights.”461 Accordingly, to say that the treaty-making power “may include 
the rights and powers of the citizens of the States not granted to the Federal 
government	.	.	.	is to claim a superiority for that power over the powers of the 
[other branches], and the powers of the States, which are equally supreme with 
the treaty-making power.”462 The seed Tucker aimed to plant with McReynolds 
did not take root, as McReynolds joined the Court’s decision upholding the 
Migratory Bird Act pursuant to the treaty-making power.463 
2. The Dual-Sovereign Treaty Power in Bond v. United States 
Although Tucker failed to convince McReynolds, the Court’s more recent 
work suggests that Tucker may have found the “tabula in naufragio” to vindicate 
his dual-sovereigntist—but anti-nationalist—theory of the treaty-making 
power. Tucker’s approach found its way into several Justices’ concurrences in 
Bond v. United States, which raised renewed skepticism about whether the 
treaty power should enlarge Congress’s ordinary legislative powers. 
On its facts, the problem posed in Bond would appear as innocuous as 
hunting out-of-season birds in Missouri. After discovering marital infidelity, a 
spouse spread toxic chemicals on surfaces that her spouse’s paramour was likely 
to touch, in an effort to give the paramour a rash.464 A prosecutor charged the 
spouse with violating a statute passed by Congress to implement the Chemical 
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1006 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 168: 931 
Weapons Convention, 18 U.S.C. § 229(a)(1), and contended that the statute 
accorded with federalism because it was passed pursuant to a treaty.465 
A majority of the Court in Bond avoided the federalism puzzle in this 
“unusual case” by finding the term “chemical weapon” in the statute to be too 
unclear to permit prosecution for such “local crimes.”466 In concurring in the 
judgment, however, three Justices criticized the majority for avoiding the 
federalism problem by way of strained statutory interpretation. 
Instead of avoiding the constitutional question, all three concurring Justices 
would have found that the statute obviously applied to the spouse’s conduct and 
thought that the Court should not shirk its duty to address the resultant 
federalism concerns.467 To that end, Justice Scalia quoted, at length, from the 
“famous scholar and jurist Henry St. George Tucker” to demonstrate that the 
danger of Holland’s view of the treaty power was clear “five years before 
[Holland] was written.”468 (As we have seen, this was no hypothetical; Tucker 
sent his work to Justice McReynolds twice in connection with Missouri v. 
Holland.469) Scalia’s concurrence then adopted Tucker’s dual-sovereign frame—
that the dual spheres of state and federal sovereignty must be rebalanced—to 
argue that Congress could not pass the Chemical Weapons Convention without 
heralding a “vast expansion of congressional power.”470 Without some subject-
matter limitation, “the possibilities of what the Federal Government may 
accomplish” by treaty are so boundless as to allow it to usurp state sovereignty.471 
As I have argued, Scalia’s (and Tucker’s) framing of foreign-affairs 
federalism as a problem of dual sovereignty simply overlooks the once-
influential, now-dormant thought that the category of powers reserved “to 
the people” is not an empty set: the treaty-making power cannot be used to 
exercise powers that are denied to both governments by the popular sovereign. 
Yet, on the concurring Justices’ view, the states’ sovereignty is made the 
relevant limit to the treaty-making power. 
This dual-sovereignty view of the treaty-making power is blinkered not 
only to more robust ideas about the Tenth Amendment’s limitations on 
treaty-making, but also to the pragmatic difficulties occasioned by separating 
“domestic”472 treaties from those of “legitimate international”473 concern. 
This proposed limitation invites the practical critique that being too solicitous 
 
465 Id. at 852-53; see also id. at 874 n.5 (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing waiver of a commerce-
clause defense). 
466 Id. at 860, 863. 
467 Id. at 867 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
468 Id. at 881 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
469 See supra text accompanying notes 457-458. 
470 Id. at 877 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
471 Id. at 878 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
472 Id. at 883 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
473 Id. at 897 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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of state sovereignty can make the Constitution a suicide pact in matters of 
true national exigency: the resolution of some existential threats to the 
republic are prone to be at once classically “international” and enormously 
municipally invasive. Those who are skeptical of the national treaty-making 
power but have decided on a dual-sovereign model of federalism are 
committed to argue either that the Constitution annihilated the capacity to 
make municipally invasive “domestic” treaties, or constrained the treaty-
making power to an undefined zone of “legitimate” international interest. 
In light of a century’s worth of municipally invasive treaties about getting 
and spending land, the Bond concurrences’ effort to limit the treaty-making 
power to subjects of legitimate international intercourse is most difficult to 
square with our history of acquisition. In earlier eras, the effort to constrain 
treaty-making to embrace only objects of “international intercourse”474 rather 
than those that “conceal[] a police power over domestic affairs”475 would 
“syllogi[ze]” the new states (whose territory was acquired by treaty) “out of 
the Union.”476 The most effective constitutional opposition to these 
municipally invasive treaties of acquisition was not that they trenched too far 
on “domestic” matters, but it was rather the popular-sovereign objection: 
these treaties infringed the reserved sovereignty of the people. The 
acquisition of Texas and cession of Maine were unlawful because the 
“disposition of sovereignty” cannot be “a subject of barter by governments.”477 
In contrast to the dual-sovereignty view of the treaty-making power, the 
limitations that popular-sovereign federalism would impose upon the federal 
treaty power are few, but defensible. Acquisition, cession, and related trappings of 
imperial (or non-republican) government are impermissible; no more, no less.478 
My historical corrective—that the treaty-making power has previously 
been limited by a popular-sovereignty-based view of foreign-affairs 
federalism—has lessons for modern “nationalists” and “new federalists” alike. 
To today’s nationalists, the imperial history suggests that the marriage of 
dual-sovereign federalism with the idea of an absolutely sovereign federal 
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government is part of an all-too-recent imperial project. That project reduced 
the number of plausible “nationalist” theories of the treaty-making power to 
one, by erasing the possibility that popular sovereignty modestly limits the 
scope of a national treaty-making power while otherwise enlarging the field 
of permissible federal legislation. And to the “new-federalist” critics of the 
treaty-making power—including, recently, three Justices of the Supreme 
Court—recovering this history suggests that the popular contention that 
today’s treaties are especially “domestic,” or especially municipally invasive, 
overlooks the many episodes in which treaties remade the composition of the 
republic by acquiring and ceding territory.479 
To be sure, the popular-sovereignty-based limit upon treaties of 
acquisition and cession is now implausible, having been litigated and 
overcome during a century of bartering territory with other sovereigns. 
Indeed, before the modern, canonical histories of the treaty-making power 
became authoritative, proponents of an imperial treaty-making power 
claimed that the most durable proof that the nation had acquiesced to an 
imperial treaty power was that the opposition to such treaties had been 
sophisticated, intense, and ultimately defeated. As Root argued, “[n]ot only 
has the right of the Central Government to acquire territory been sustained, 
but it has been upheld by the Supreme Court in the face of most bitter 
factional opposition, evidenced on every occasion on which the 
boundaries	.	.	.	have been extended.”480 
The weakness of popular-sovereign federalism, moreover, lies in its 
canonical unorthodoxy. If popular sovereignty limits the treaty-making 
power, then foreign-affairs sovereignty must be recast in either tripartite 
(federal-state-popular) terms or as the antonym of dual-sovereign federalism 
(the people, but neither the states nor the federal government, are sovereign). 
Either view is now fantastically unimaginable. Insisting that some treaty-
making powers are reserved to the popular sovereign is no longer taken to be 
a plausible argument—it is, in Sutherland’s words, not “come-at-able.”481 
Indeed, as a result of judicial settlement and influential historicist 
arguments crafted in an imperial era, our public law now rejects the idea that 
a dormant popular sovereign retains any important foreign-affairs power.482 
This canonical status of the dual-sovereign theory of foreign-affairs 
federalism is highly unlikely to change for at least two reasons. 
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First, as discussed, the most obvious limitations that popular-sovereign 
federalism might impose upon the treaty power—prohibiting acquisition or 
cession—are the limits most breached in our history. 
Second, the canonical understanding of the methods of public law 
(international and American) has radically diverged. Whereas international 
and American public law traveled together in charting the foreign-affairs 
federalism of the mid-nineteenth to early-twentieth century, they now use 
materially different grammars of argument. 
The best illustration of this divergence is suggested by the last notable 
episode of the new states’ effort to wrest the eminent dominion from the 
federal government. In October 1945, President Truman issued a 
proclamation announcing that it would be his Administration’s policy that 
“the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf ” are 
“subject to [federal] jurisdiction and control.”483 The same year, the 
government filed an original-jurisdiction case in the Supreme Court, United 
States v. California, contending that the federal government was the “owner in 
fee simple of, or possessed of paramount rights in and powers over, the 
lands	.	.	.	underlying the Pacific Ocean . . . on the coast of California.”484 
The parties’ briefing in California evinces the baroque law-of-nations 
reasoning that framed the prior century’s precedents. The government’s 
opening brief, for example, began with a 30-page disquisition on the concept 
of a “territorial sea” from the time of Roman law, as well as the “writings of 
publicists.”485 California’s brief teed up a familiar question from the earlier 
era: because riverbeds often debouch into the territorial sea, should not Hagan 
apply to the land below that sea? 
The Court agreed with the federal government that the sovereigntist logic 
of Hagan actually entailed a national eminent dominion. As Justice Black 
wrote for the majority, if Hagan gave state sovereigns the right to lands below 
inland waters, that logic ultimately favored federal title to the seabed: unlike 
inland rivers, these waters implicate “national interests [and] responsibilities, 
and therefore national rights are paramount.”486 The California Court thus 
used dual-sovereign federalism to favor a preferred sovereign—the federal 
sovereign holds eminent dominion.487 
Writing in dissent, Justice Frankfurter criticized the majority’s confusion 
about the eminent dominion. Frankfurter explained Thayer’s old lesson that the 
eminent dominion stood for many different things, some of which are 
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incompatible with American public law.488 Lou Henkin’s first draft of the 
opinion explained that “[t]he Court confuses ‘national dominion’ over land or 
sea with property rights in such areas.”489 Although “the United States 
exercise[d] national dominion, paramount sovereign power, over all the territory 
that is properly in the United States	.	.	.	,” that did not prove enough to give the 
federal government title.490 If the federal government wished to prove “property 
rights in the land in question, it can find no support for its claim to such rights 
in the fact that it has exercised constitutional powers with regard to such 
property.”491 Frankfurter added to Henkin’s draft that “[t]o speak of dominion 
carries precisely those overtones in the law which relate to property and not to 
political authority. Dominion	.	.	.	was concerned with property and ownership 
as against imperium, which related to political sovereignty.”492 Frankfurter 
explained that “of course the United States has ‘paramount rights’ in the sea 
belt	.	.	.	.	[But the] rights of ownership are something else.”493 
Frankfurter took a moment to mark a critical shift in the methodology of 
public international law since the prior century. He called for modernization, 
arguing that the litigants had relied too heavily on the “dubious and tenuous 
writings of publicists.”494 He also cited a just-published Harvard Law Review 
article that explained how an “inductive” method of international law had 
now overtaken the “deductive” approach of days past.495 The old deductivists 
now failed to “grapple seriously with the systematic presentation of the 
practice of individual states.”496 Justice McKinley’s old law-of-nations 
reasoning, Frankfurter explained, had led the Court astray.497 
Frankfurter’s emphasis in these cases on the changing sources and 
methods of international legal argument coincided with international efforts 
to firm up the discipline as a more positivist, scientific enterprise. His 
description of the way international law is found and described has ascended 
as the dominant mode of public international legal argument.498 
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Notwithstanding the modernization of public international law, American 
public law is still prone to practice the old ways. As Sarah Cleveland has 
explained, Justice Sutherland expressly forced a dual-sovereigntist frame onto 
nearly all constitutional questions touching upon foreign affairs, though the 
roots of his views are quite old.499 Little, however, secures Sutherland’s 
conceit in the modern Supreme Court.500 
In taking up the Court’s invitation to reappraise the foreign-affairs 
settlements of the early-twentieth century, it is worth considering whether 
the post-Holland debate over dual-sovereign federalism has exhausted all 
plausible theories of the people’s delegation of foreign-affairs powers to their 
governments. That is especially so if the imperial era to which this orthodoxy 
belongs is no longer a part of our public law. While the early-twentieth-
century settlements make reviving a popular-sovereign foreign-affairs 
federalism impossible, defining subject-matter limitations on the treaty 
power in light of our “dual sovereign” federalism is equally indefensible. 
CONCLUSION 
What are today at least three discrete public law puzzles were in earlier 
eras a single question: can American governments, by exercising the treaty-
making power, lay claim to the eminent dominion, as that idea is understood 
in the law of nations? Today, by contrast, we ask disparate questions that yield 
provincial (and highly contingent) answers: (1) Can the government acquire 
territory by treaty? Yes—Chief Justice Marshall put that question to rest. (2) 
Can the federal government dismember the empire by a treaty of cession? 
No—the Federalist Papers are skeptical. (3) Can the federal government hold title 
to public land within the states? Plainly. (4) What is the political status of 
acquired territories? That is up to Congress. (5) Finally, are there subject-matter 
limitations on either the treaty-making power or the legislation-giving effect 
to treaties? No, in light of Missouri v. Holland. All of these were interconnected 
“eminent dominion” questions in mid-nineteenth- to early-twentieth-century 
national politics, but they could not be further apart in today’s constitutional 
law canon. After all, whose mind now runs from treaties to takings? 
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This Article revives a view of popular-sovereign federalism that once 
flourished in the American reception of the eminent dominion and in related 
conflicts regarding acquisition and cession. The records left behind are rich 
catalogues of federalism in practice. They are also evidence of the republic’s 
almost immediate embrace of a common-law constitutionalism, which selectively 
deployed the law of nations to spar about national—and then imperial—politics. 
As I have argued, our constitutional experience has rendered both the old 
popular-sovereign limitations and the proposed new state-sovereignty 
limitations on the treaty-making power impossible to reconcile with the shape 
of the modern republic. We have not, by contrast, advanced a durable answer 
to the political status of the insular territories. Instead, the Court remains 
fixated on a history of the imperial possessions’ eminent dominion that is 
nearly impossible to distinguish from the genesis of the new states. The 
Court’s pretense that the identification of “deep” federal “wellsprings” in our 
acquired territory should resolve the question of the insular territories’ 
“sovereignty” is historically dubious. It is, for related reasons, deeply suspect 
as a mode of structuring modern American government. 
Remarkably, nearly every one of the losing partisans described in this 
Article expected their remedy in the infamy of history. Whether they sought 
to wrest title from the federal government or to resist the tide of American 
imperialism, those who reflected on their moment in constitutional time 
expected their adversaries to become infamous in the eyes of future 
generations who soberly reflected on the past. 
Our foreign-affairs originalism, which ordinarily finds constitutional 
meaning in historicist sorties into the past, has made these partisans’ hope 
vain. The eminent-dominion debates simply disclose to us what we already 
knew: the American constitutional regime has acquiesced to and been 
irretrievably changed by many intense episodes of constitutional politics. 
Such episodes, when they arise anew, require lawyers practicing public law to 
do their thinking for themselves. The “deepest wellsprings”501 of the past are 
as prone to erase as to reveal our Constitution’s meaning. 
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